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THE COMMERCIAL DOCTRINE OF GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
GRANT 1LMORE-I
THE triumph 4 the good faith purchaser has been one of the most dramatic
episodes in our legal history. In his several guises, he serves a commercial
function: he is protected not because of his praiseworthy character, but to
the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate
investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property
by one who offers it for sale or to secure a loan. As the doctrine strikes roots in
one or another field, the "good faith" component tends to atrophy and the
commercial purchaser is protected with little more than lip service paid to
his "bona fides."
GOOD FAITH PURCHASE IN THE LAW OF SALEs
The commerciality of the good faith purchase doctrine can be demonstrated
by a brief history of its growth in the law of sale of goods. The intangible
evidences of property, with which the balance of this article Will be concerned,
are by their nature almost exclusively commercial. Goods, however, lead a
double life: as inventory, they are the subject matter of commercial transac-
tions; as possessions, the things we live by, they have passed out of the stream
of commerce and come to rest. Although Anglo-American law does not pur-
port to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial transactions, goari
faith purchase in the law of sales has, in fact, a very different operation in the
two cases.
The initial common law position was that equities of ownership are to be
protected at all costs: an owner may never be deprived of his property rights
without his consent. That worked well enough against a background of local
distribution where seller and buyer met face to face and exchanged goods for
cash. But as the marketplace became first regional and then national, a recur-
rent situation came to be the misappropriation of goods by a faithless agent
in fraud of his principal. Classical theory required that the principal he pr.-
tected and that the risks of agency distribution be cast on the purchaser. The
market demanded otherwise.
The first significant breach in common law property theory was the protec-
tion of purchasers from such commercial agents. The reform was carried out
through so-called Factor's Acts, which were widely enacted in the early part
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of the 19th century.' Under these Acts any person who entrusted goods to
a factor-or agent-for sale took the risk of the factor's selling them beyond
his authority; anyone buying from a factor in good faith, relying on his
possession of the goods, and without notice of limitations on his authority,
took good title against the true owner. In time the Acts were expanded to
protect people, i.e., banks, who took goods from a factor as security for loans
made to the factor to be used in operating the factor's own business. 2 The
Factor's Acts, as much in derogation of the common law as it is possible for a
statute to be, were restrictively construed 3 and consequently turned out to be
considerably less than the full grant of mercantile liberty which they had first
appeared to be. Other developments in the law gradually took the pressure off
the Factor's Acts, which came to be confined to the narrow area of sales
through commission merchants, mostly in agricultural produce markets. 4
1. The first English Act (4 George IV, c. 83) was passed in 1824 and thereafter
several times amended to overrule restrictive judicial constructions. See 2 WILUSTON,
SALES §§ 318, 319 (rev. ed. 1948). A group of Eastern and Mid-Western States then
enacted similar, although by no means uniform statutes: Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. A comparable provision
was included in the California Civil Code and copied in Montana and North Dakota. See
2 id. § 320, collecting the statutory citations.
2. Thus the Massachusetts Act, passed in 1845 (Mass. Stat. 1845, c. 193) covered
only buyers. An amendment in 1849 was added to protect pledgees. Mass. Stat. 1849,
c. 216, § 3. In Michigan State Bank v. Gardner, 15 Gray 362 (Mass. 1860), the court refused
to protect a pledgee who took goods in 1847, commenting: "[The 1849 amendment] was
passed after this transaction, and cannot affect it. But it shows that the former statute was
insufficient... and by expressly giving the authority to pledge implies that the authority
did not exist before, even where the pledge was made in good faith and with probable
cause to believe that the agent had authority, and was not acting fraudulently therein
against the owner of the property." Id. at 374.
3. The New York Commission of Appeals (the highest court in the state) ex-
pressed the prevalent attitude in First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N.Y. 283, 304
(1874) : "Considerable stress was laid at the argument, by counsel on either side of the
case, on the great consequences to commerce of a decision in this cause adverse to their
respective views. Finding the principles of law clearly settled, we are bound to ad-
minister them as they have come down to us from our predecessors. . . . While com-
mercial convenience must be respected, the rights of property must not be sacrificed ....
The true interests of commerce demand that the claims under bills of lading and other
such instruments should be scrupulously protected, since commerce will not flourish where
the rights of property are not respected." The case involved grain shipped to New
York City. The New York factor, to whom the bill of lading was delivered by plaintiff's
agent, warehoused the goods on delivery and pledged the resulting warehouse receipt to
defendant. Plaintiff was allowed to replevy the goods on the theory that there had been
no "entrusting" of the bill of lading and that the warehouse receipt was "mere waste
paper." Ibid. No distinction is taken in the opinion between negotiable and nonnegotiable
documents. For a relatively modern reiteration of the same restrictive construction
of the Factor's Acts, see Gazzola v. Lacy Bros. & Kimball, 156 Tenn. 229, 299 S.W. 1039
(1927) (also involving a substitution of warehouse receipt for the original bill of lading).
The Gazzola case is criticized in an excellent note in 12 MiNN. L. REV. 633 (1928)
which collects much of the early material.
4. The practice in the jewelry trade of delivering diamonds on memorandum or
consignment to peripatetic sales agents led to a flurry of litigation in New York.
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Even while they were cutting the heart out of the Factor's Acts, the courts
were finding new ways to shift distribution risks. Their happiest discovery
was the concept of "voidable title"--a vague idea, never defined and perhaps
incapable of definition, whose greatest virtue, as a principle of growth, may
well have been its shapeless imprecision of outline. The polar extremes of
theory were these: if B buys goods from A, he gets A's title and can transfer
it to any subsequent purchaser; if B steals goods from A, he gets no title
and can transfer none to any subsequent purchaser, no matter how clear the
purchaser's good faith.5 "Voidable title" in B came in as an intermediate
term between the two extremes: if B gets possession of A's goods by fraud,
even though he has no right to retain them against A4, he does have the
power to transfer title to a good faith purchaser.0
Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society, 265 N.Y. 393, 193 N.E. 245 (1934); Sweet & Co. v.
Provident Loan Society, 279 N.Y. 540, 18 N.E.2d 847 (1939); Mann v. R. Simpson &
Co., 286 N.Y. 450, 36 N.E.2d 658 (1941); Mendelsohn v. R. Simpson & Co., 267
App. Div. 564, 47 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1st Dep't 1944) ; Landau v. Cramer, 32 N.Y.S2d CIA
(Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Lindner v. Winston, 151 Misc. 499, 270 N.Y.Supp. 829 (N.Y. City Ct.
1933). Before the passage of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and perhaps as a contribut-
ing factor to its passage, there were suggestions in tv-o New York cases that the Factor's
Act might be applicable to purchasers of collateral entrusted under trust receipts. Sce
In re James, Inc., 30 F2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929) and Commercial Credit Corp. v. Northern
Westchester Bank, 256 N.Y. 482, 177 N.E. 12 (1931). To the iame effect in Massa-
chusetts: Associates Discount Corp. v. C. E. Fay Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 X.E.2d 876
(1940) (involving a transaction which occurred after the passage of the Trust Receipts
Act but which, because there was no signed writing, fell outside that Act). It is a nice
question whether, in States adopting the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited
as UCC), § 2-404 will operate to repeal the old Factor's Acts.
5. "It is a fundamental doctrine of the law, of property that no one can give what
he has not.... [O]ne who has no title at all can transfer none, and that a buyer from
him pays value in good faith without notice makes no difference." 2 WiLusIoSl, SALF;
§ 311 (rev. ed. 1948). Cf. UNiFoRm SALEs Acr § 23: "Subject to the prcvisions of thin
act, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and V.ho d,
not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires
no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the geuds is by hiq
conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell."
6. The Uniform Sales Act has several provisions on the point. Under § 24 "Why're
the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not Intn avided at
the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, .rovided he buy-;
them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect uf title." Under
§ 25 the case of the seller who remains in possession of the gods aftr a tale i,
treated in much the same way with the exceptions that § 25 introduces a r.qu*rcn .lt
that the goods be physically delivered to the second buyer, which is apparently nut pr,'.rvt
in § 24 and that the transactions protected under § 25 are "any sale, I,!dge or other
disposition" of the goods while § 24, read literally, protects only "buyer.P (an rv-,t
pledgees and other transferees for security). Furthermore § 20(4), dealing with tht c-
where a seller has drawn a draft on buyer and "transmitted" both the draft a1 a ill
of lading to him, provides that, even though the buyer fails to honor the draft, a "pur-
chaser" (as defined in the Act the term includes mortgagees and tledgees) from him in
good faith and for value who "receives delivery" of either the bill of lading or the go ds
takes free of the original owner's interest. WILU.IsToN, SALs (rev. ed. 1948), casts no
light on the reason for the discrepancies among the several sections.
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The ingenious distinction between "no title" in B (therefore true owner
prevails over good faith purchaser) and "voidable title" in B (therefore true
owner loses to good faith purchaser) made it possible to throw the risk on
the true owner in the typical commercial situation while protecting him in the
noncommercial one. Since the law purported to be a deduction from basic
premises, logic prevailed in some details to the detriment of mercantile need,
but on the whole voidable title proved a useful touchstone.
The contrasting treatment given to sales on credit and sales for cash shows
the inarticulate development of the commercial principle. When goods are
delivered on credit, the seller becomes merely a creditor for the price: on de-
fault he has no right against the goods.7 But when the delivery is induced
by buyer's fraud-buyer being unable to pay or having no intention of paying
-the seller, if he acts promptly after discovering the facts, may replevy from
the buyer or reclaim from buyer's trustee in bankruptcy.8 The seller may
not, however, move against purchasers from the buyer, and the term "pur-
chaser" includes lenders who have made advances on the security of the
goods.9 By his fraudulent acquisition the buyer has obtained voidable title
and purchasers from him are protected.
Cash sale theory developed quite differently. A reasonable man might sup-
pose that if taking goods on credit without the intention or ability to pay for
them is fraud, then the same practice where the buyer is supposed to pay
cash would be the same kind of fraud. The courts have held, however, in the
cash sale situation that something more serious than "mere" fraud is involved,
something approaching theft--"larceny by trick or device" as the time-honored
phrase runs-and that consequently the defaulting cash sale buyer gets no
title, and can transfer none to a good faith purchaser.10
7. The seller may reserve a security interest, as by conditional sale or chattel Mort-
gage. If he does not, he loses his lien on the goods by voluntary delivery to the buyer.
UNIFORM SALES Acr § 56. A traditional case denying the seller's right to replevy goods
delivered, even when the terms of the contract called for cash payment and the seller
had continually insisted on payment, is Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 Atl. 45 (1907).
8. The leading case is California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir,.
1933), which marked an advance over the earlier case law in holding that no intention
not to pay on the part of the buyer need be proved if the facts show that by reason of
his financial situation he could not have hoped to pay in any case. For discussion see
3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 5, § 636 et seq.
9. Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N.Y. 212, 163 N.E. 737 (1928).
10. The underlying theory of the cash sale is that no title passes on delivery-
contrary to the usual sales doctrine under which title passes, as to specific goods in a
deliverable state, when the contract is made, even though neither payment nor delivery
has occurred. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 19, rule 1. Since no title has passed, where delivery
is for cash, seller may replevy against buyer, unless as in Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141,
67 Atl. 45 (1907), he is held to have waived his right by delay. The rights of third
parties, therefore, are governed by § 23 of the Sales Act (sale by a person not the
owner) rather than § 24 (sale by one having a voidable title). Curiously, the Sales
Act has no express provision on cash sales; the common law doctrine presumably
survives as a casits oinissus under § 73 ("In any case not provided for in this act, the
rules of law and equity, including the law merchant . . . shall continue to apply. .... )
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The cash sale theory is stated in the cases as a general rule. But in fact it
is almost never applied against good faith purchasers in a commercial setting,."
Most of the cash sale cases involve recoveries from purchasers, whoie good
faith is doubtful in the first instance, by sellers who are either retail merchants
or consumers disposing of their own second-hand possessions. 1 - So confined,
as in fact it has been,13 the cash sale theory is a useful weapon for striking
For discussion see 2 WLnisToN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 341 cl seq.; Note, The "Cash
Sale" Presnnption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and Policy Anomaly 62 Yu= 1J.
101 (1952).
11. One of the few cases which has applied-or misapplied-the cash sale theory
against a good faith purchaser in an ordinary course of business commercial situati- n
is itself a striking demonstration of how carefully the operation of the theory has been
confined. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 150 Ore. 172,
38 P.2d 48, rehearing, 150 Ore. 203, 43 P.2d 1078 (1935), involved a cash sale of
lumber to an insolvent who, having received delivery, resold to various purchasers avid
assigned the resulting accounts receivable to the defendant bank which made pr,:,mnt
advances against the accounts. In its first opinion the court gave judgment to the plaintiff
seller against the bank for the proceeds of the resales on a theory as to which, in a
second opinion, the court confessed itself to have been in error. Nevertheless on rchcaring
the court adhered to its original decision, assigning as its principal reason a cash sale
theory. Under the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the court searched
diligently for all available supporting authority. The best it could do was Johnson v.
Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24, 102 Pac. 799 (1910), see note 12 infra, one of its ovn prior
cases, and a series of cases from other jurisdictions which, although involving co.m-
mercial transaction, went no further than to support seller's recovery a!,,. ainst defnultin-
buyer's lien creditors. Between the lien creditor seeking to collect a prc.xisting claim
and the subsequent purchaser in good faith there is a polar distance. Aiart from t.v
cyceerhaeuser case itself, and a subsequent case in the same jurisdiction (Keegan et al.
v. Lenzie, 171 Ore. 194, 135 P2d 717 (1943)), there is no case authoriky supporting a
cash sale recovery against a subsequent good faith purchaser in a commercial oonte.xt,
whether the purchaser be a buyer or a lender against security. See cases discussed nte
13 infra.
12. The typical case is Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24, 102 Pac. 799 (1910), relied
on by the court in the Weyerhacuscr case, supra note 11. Johnson sold two guns to
Adams, who gave a bad check in payment of the price of $45.05. On the day Adamb
got the guns from Johnson he resold them to Iankovetz for $22. Johnson, who tok action
as soon as he learned of the dishonor of Adams' check, was allowed to replevy from
Iankovetz. Although defendant's status as a good faith purchaser is not questiuned in
the opinion, the fact remains that he bought the guns from Adams for less than half
of what they were presumably worth.
13. DeVries v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 100 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn. 1951), des allow
a recovery against a purchaser of commercial property but goes off on the special ground
that, because of his status, a livestock commission merchant is not entitled to the protec-
tion that ordinarily goes to good faith purchaser. The YALe Note referred to nt 10
supra cites a number of cases as if they involved such recoveries, but on investigation
the cases stack up as follows: Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co. v. Harger, 1Z9 Cunn.
655, 31 A2d 27 (1943) (defendant was sheriff who had attached goods Lkause of unpaid
state taxes; seller recovers on cash sale theory); Tyler v. Kdley TimL:r Products CV.,
192 Ore. 368, 233 P.2d 774 (1951) (plaintiff was a logger; defndant had taken a
mortgage on all the assets of the timber company largely fur antecedent debt, and it due,
not appear that the mortgage had been recorded) ; Parker v. First-Citizens Bank & Trt
Co., 229 N.C. 527, 50 S.E.2d 304 (1948) (automubile; action was not against gvud faith
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down fraudulent, often quasi-criminal, transactions which, lying far outside
the mainstream of commerce, need no protection on mercantile grounds.
11
Sales law offers a guide to the basic line of division. We shall henceforward
be concerned with commercial intangibles: negotiable instruments, stocks and
bonds, documents of title, "chattel paper" (to borrow a term from the Uni-
form Commercial Code), accounts receivable, and the like. It will be the
aim of this discussion to demonstrate that as these intangibles come into use,
the regular course of business transferee is, on one or another theory, granted
the privileged status of the good faith purchaser-holding free of latent de-
fenses and equities.
GOOD FAITH PURCHASE OF INTANGIBLES: NEGOTIABILITY
The good faith purchase idea takes on an extra dimension of complexity
when intangibles and not goods are concerned. Goods have an ascertainable
purchaser, but against agent of deceased buyer for proceeds of resale); Barksdale v.
Banks, 206 Ala. 569, 90 So. 913 (1921) (sale of two mules to livery stable; seller recovers
from good faith purchaser); Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n, 186 Minn. 236, 243 N.W.
106 (1932) (retail jeweler recovers diamond from pawnbroker).
Lewis v. McMahon & Co., 307 Mo. 552, 271 S.W. 779 (1925) is a commercial case:
S sold 25 carloads of oil to B who paid with a check on defendant bank; B then pledged
the bills of lading with the same bank; the bank dishonored the check but retained the
bills of lading and sold the oil. The court refers to cash sale theory but the result (S
recovers value of oil from bank in conversion) is obviously predicated on defendant's
lack of good faith. For a case reaching the same result on remarkably similar facts but
without reference to cash sale theory, see Commercial Say. Bank of Grand Rapids v.
Mann, 206 App. Div. 297, 200 N.Y. Supp. 587 (4th Dep't 1923).
Quality Shingle Co. v. Old Oregon Lumber & Shingle Co., 110 Wash. 60, 187 Pac.
705 (1920) is also a case in a commercial setting in which S recovered the value of a
carload of shingles from a good faith purchaser. Here S asserted his rights while the
goods were still in transit, moving under a nonnegotiable bill of lading. The court bases
its decision on provisions of the Federal Bills of Lading Act. See text at note 68 infira.
14. The typical method of denying a seller recovery against a good faith purchaser is
to find that by delay seller has waived his rights. Most of the cases involve payment
by worthless check. Professor Williston has long argued against the cash sale result
in the check cases on the theory that the seller who delivers goods against a check is
in fact selling on credit and not for cash. Although the theory had no case law support
when propounded in the first edition of Williston's treatise on Sales, recent cases sug-
gest that the courts are beginning to make use of it. See, e.g., Pingleton v. Shepherd, 219
Ark. 473, 242 S.W.2d 971 (1951) ; Gerber v. Pike, 249 S.W2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
2 Wn.soN, SA.us, § 341 et seq. (Supp. 1953) has a collection of the recent cases,
which involve, almost without exception, automobiles bought by the fraudulent actor
from Dealer A and promptly resold to Dealer B, who typically buys with his eyes tightly
shut and without requiring production of title certificate or other indicia of ownership.
The UCC purports to abolish cash sale theory. Cf. § 2-401 (1) (b) : "[N]o agreement
that a contract for sale is a 'cash sale' alters the effects of identification or impairs the
rights of good faith purchasers from the buyer." Furthermore § 2-403 (2) provides:
"Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business." The term "buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined in § 1-201 (9)
to exclude pawnbrokers and persons buying from farmers.
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location in space and time. If they are in Connecticut it is obvious, even to
the legal mind, that they are not in New York. If A, the owner, sells goods
to B, then A, except for claims based on breach of warranty, has nothing
further to do with them. Nor has anyone ever doubted that goods can be
sold. Even if, theoretically, goods can be made the subject of the sort of
future interests which make up so much of our real property law, they have
never in fact been so burdened.
None of these truisms is safe when we come to intangibles. Intangibles
are not in themselves property, in the sense that goods are; they are claims
to property. Thus when A gives his promissory note to B who negotiates to
'C who in turn negotiates it to D, what is being bought and sold is not the
piece of paper which physically changes hands but the right to collect a
certain amount of money from A which is represented by the piece of paper.
Furthermore two distinct types of dispute can arise on the transfer of intang-
ibles, only one of which is possible when goods are sold. When C, having
acquired A's note from B, sells it to D, D has to worry not only whether he
has acquired good title to the note against B, the original owner, but also
whether the claim against A was valid in the first place. When he buys goods
from C and takes delivery, he may or may not get title (depending on whether
or not C is a thief) but at least he can be sure that the goods exist. When
he buys A's note and takes delivery of that, it is far from certain that there
ever was a claim against A, whose signature may have been forged or extorted
or who may be free of liability because of usury. Moreover if A, a resident
of Connecticut, mails the note to B in New York, and if C and D are residents
of Florida and California, it may be far from clear, even to the lay mind,
exactly where the claim against A "is."
Finally in contrast to the idea that public policy favors the free alienability
of chattels, the law relating to the transfer of intangibles starts from the propo-
sition that claims--choses in action-are not assignable. It is hard for us to
understand why this should ever have been the law. The rule may have
come in at a time when intangible property was little known, insignificant as
a form of wealth, and therefore could be summarily disposed of in a short-
hand phrase. Ve like to say that it is no longer the law today.
The development of the law of good faith purchase in this field has thus
had to take account of burdensome complexities which were not met with in
the relatively simple case of goods. It has been necessary to work out a
number of subordinate propositions in addition to. the basic one that the
purchaser in good faith and for value gets "title" or "good title" or even
"perfect title." It is this network of good faith purchase rules that we mean
when we describe paper as "negotiable."
Negotiable Instruments and Nonnegotiable Choses
"Negotiable" and "negotiability" are words rarely, if ever, defined. They
mean not one but many things. The principal attributes of negotiability are
these:
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(1) The paper must be freely assignable; no restraints on alienation
will be tolerated.' 5
(2) The debt claim is "merged" into the paper evidencing the claim;
thus the paper must be treated in many situations as if it were the claim
itself:
a) Transfer of the claim can only be made by physical delivery
of the paper, completed by evidence of the transferor's intent to
transfer which is customarily given by his indorsement on the
paper itself ;16
b) Discharge of the debt evidenced by the paper can be made
only by payment to (or cancellation by) the holder-the person
physically in possession ;17
c) Creditors of a holder can assert their claims against the paper
(as part of the debtor's assets) only by getting possession of it
through appropriate legal process, and not by serving a garnish-
ment order on the obligor ;18
d) The situs of the debt is where the paper is. 19
(3) In pursuing his claim against the obligor, the holder receives the
benefit of a series of presumptions which cast on the defendant the greater
15. An instrument to be negotiable must contain the magic words of negotiability:
payable to "order" or to "bearer." NIL § 1. Any attempt to prohibit transfer would
make the paper nonnegotiable, since the promise to pay would no longer be "uncondi-
tional." Ibid.
16. "Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until
delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto." NIL § 16. "If
payable to bearer [an instrument] is negotiated by delivery, if payable to order it is
negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery." NIL § 30.
17. See NIL §§ 119 and 88. § 119(4) provides that a negotiable instrument is dis-
charged "[bly any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of
money." A debtor on a simple contract discharges his debt by paying his original
creditor, even though the claim may have been assigned, provided the debtor has not
received notice of the assignment. RFSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 170 (1932). Payment by
the obligor of a negotiable instrument to a prior holder, without notice that the iustru-
ment has been further negotiated, does not discharge a negotiable instrument, even though
§ 119(4) seems to say that it does: BRITrON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NoTs
§ 270 (1943). For the cases see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1114 Ct seq.
(7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
18. This proposition is apparently considered to be so self-evident that it goes without
saying. Neither the NIL nor Article 3 of the UCC bothers to codify it and the point Is
not even mentioned in BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 17. BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 826-8 collects a few cases, mostly of relatively ancient vintage, which are consistent
with the statement in the text. The point seemed less obvious with regard to share
certificates and documents of title and appropriate provisions were included in the relevant
codifying statutes. See notes 62 and 73 inf ra.
19. RESTATEMENT, CoNFicr OF LAWS § 349 (1934): "The validity and effect of a
transfer of a negotiable instrument are determined by the law of the place where the
instrument is at the time of its transfer."
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part of the burden of proof normally carried by plaintiffs in contract
actions.2 0
(4) On default by the obligor, the holder has an automatic right of
recourse against prior indorsers.2'
(5) As to "purchase in good faith, without notice and for value":
a) a purchaser is "in good faith" as long as he is "subjectively"
honest at the time he takes the paper: he is under no duty of in-
quiry; he may even have "forgotten" relevant information; he is
merely required not to be actively in bad faith;2-
20. The most important of these presumptions are that: consideration was given for
the instrument (NIL § 24) ; the instrument was delivered by the obliger to the first
holder (NIL § 16); any person in possesion of an instrument has prima facie authrity
to fill any blanks in it (NIL § 14) ; all negotiations were made before maturity (NIL
§ 45) ; every holder is a holder in due course (NIL § 59). Curiously the XIL des not
contain a provision under which signiatures are presumed to be valid. The cases c.nse-
quently hold that, where a signature is denied, the burden of proof to establish its genuine-
ness is on the plaintiff. See BnrrroN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 129. The UCC, in § 3-307,
adds to all the NIL presumptions a presumption of genuineness of controverted signatures
in favor of a holder.
21. NIL § 66. By qualifying his indorsement (i.e., adding the words "without re-
course" to his signature), the indorser may disclaim such liability.
22. See generally BnnrroN, op. cit. supra note 17, §§ 100, 101. The NIL formulation
is that "[t]o constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taling
the instrument amounted to bad faith" (§ 56). The UCC in addition to an elaborate
provision on notice (§ 3-304) provides that a holder in due course is one who takes
the instrument "in good faith including observance of the reasonable commercial standards
of any business in which the holder may be engaged" (§ 3-302(7) (b)). The "reastable
commercial standards" language has come into controversy. In hearings on the UCC
before the New York Law Revision Commission it was attacked by representatives of
New York City banks as a reversion to the "objective" standard of good faith announced
by the Court of King's Bench in 1824 in Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466 (1824), later
abandoned both in England (Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870 (1836)) and the United
States ('Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110 (U.S. 184)). Prop ,nents of the UCC have
denied any intention of going back to the rule of Gill v'. CrTitt and have insisted that,
whether the NIL concept of good faith be described as "subjective" or something else,
the ordinary course of business idea has in fact played a major role in the decisions, soj
that no change in the law is intended or effected. "hen plaintiff's good faith is contro-
verted, the issue is one for the jury and presumably will continue to be under the UCC.
The principal effect of the "reasonable commercial standards" language may b to make
evidence of business practice more easily admissible. Although the Code provision is
attacked as an attempt to raise the standards of good faith requisite to due course
holding, it could, paradoxically, have the opposite effect: plaintiff's chances for a directed
verdict, on a showing that he did observe the "reasonable commercial standards of [the]
business in which [he %%-as] engaged," might well be better than they are under the pre!Cent
law. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27 (1935), is regularly cited as the finest
flower of the "'subjective" theory-broker purchased stolen bunds after having reccived
notice, allegedly forgotten, that they had been stolen-but it merely hld that plaintiff
had made enough of a case to go to the jury. Under UCC § 3-302 plaintiff, $n a proper
showing, might be held entitled to a directed verdict.
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b) a purchaser is not put on notice by anything not contained
in the paper itself; he is not subject to constructive notice from
public recordation or to limitations contained in collateral agree-
ments unless the limitations are actually known to him ;23
c) a purchaser has "given value" if he has given any considera-
tion sufficient to support a simple contract; moreover a pre-exist-
ing debt constitutes value.
2 4
(6) Any holder, even though he took the instrument in bad faith, with
notice of defenses, after maturity and without giving value, has all the
rights of any prior holder in due course from whom his title derives (pro-
vided only that he himself is not a party to any fraud or illegality affecting
the instrument) .25
(7) A holder in due course, or a holder whose title is derived from
such a holder, holds the instrument free both of equities of prior owners
of the instrument, and of defenses of the obligor except the so-called
"real" defenses. The real defenses, which are nowhere defined in the
Negotiable Instruments Law, cover essentially the cases where there
never was a claim against the obligor on the instrument: forgery, insanity
or other lack of capacity to contract, and duress.
2 6
23. See Ba0rroN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 112. There is a lurking ambiguity here.
When a negotiable instrument is itself collateral security for a loan (as when A's note to
B is used to secure B's debt to X), no one has ever thought that filing by X under the
chattel mortgage statute was either necessary or relevant to the perfection of X's security
interest in A's note. But cf. Sammet v. Mayer, 108 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1939), which
misread an obscure provision of N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230 to mean that filing was a per-
missable alternative to pledge in the case of stocks and bonds. The filing provisions of
Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 13 do not apply to "instruments" which are the subject
matter of a trust receipt transaction. The Secured Transactions Article of the UCC
specifically provides that a security interest in "instruments" or "documents" may not be
perfected by filing (§ 9-303(3)). Suppose, however, that X purchases a note that is
secured by mortgage. Under the theory of "imparting negotiability," see text at note 88
infra, he will hold both note and mortgage free of defenses and equities and no prior
interest in the mortgage although recorded would be good against him. On the other
hand X would be subject to any prior interest in the land shown by the recording system.
To that extent then purchasers of negotiable instruments secured by chattel or real prop-
erty are on constructive notice of interests in the security shown by the appropriate
filing or recording system.
24. NIL § 25.
25. NIL § 58. The second sentence is the so-called "shelter" clause, which always
comes as a shock to beginning students of negotiable instruments law. The underlying
theory is presumably to preserve the marketability of the paper once it has come into the
hands of a holder in due course. That knowledge of defenses does not make a purchaser
a "party to the fraud," see BearoN, op. cit. .trpra note 17, §§ 123, 124.
26. NIL § 57, read literally, seems to suggest no distinction between real and
personal defenses. "A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect
of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among them-
selves .. " On the real defenses see BRInrON, op. cit. yupra note 17, § 125 el seq.
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Of the blessings which flow so bounteously for the holder in due course
of negotiable paper, the assignee of the "ordinary," "simple" or nonnegotiable
chose in action receives only a thin triclde. The doctrine of good faith pur-
chase which made inroads even in the law of sale of goods seems here to be
ignored. And the constellation of supporting rules here casts a light so dim
that it is almost invisible. The original common law rule against assignability
has been grudgingly reversed, but there is still virtually unanimous agreement
on the proposition that the obligor can forbid the assignment of any claim
against him.-, The reification of the written evidence of the debt through
the operation of the doctrine of merger has made no headv.ay. Consequently
the assignee is deprived of the vital protection which the holder gets from
possession of the paper: until the obligor receives proper notification of
assignment, he may discharge the obligation by paying the assignor ;2 S creditors
are not required to go after the paper ;- the locus of the claim is shrouded
in mystical confusion. 30 Since the paper itself is not looked on as being,
symbolically, the claim itself, physical delivery is not the one effective means
of transfer and possession of the paper is not an effective guaranty that the
claim has not been transferred to someone else. Consequently a large part
of the law of assignment of choses in action has to do with priorities among
successive assignees. 3 ' The useful series of presumptions which run in favor
of the holder of negotiable paper do not come in to lighten the assignee's
burden. Also reversed is the rule that on default by the obligor there is an
automatic right of recourse against the transferor.32 Nor has there taken place
27. Cf. RESTATEMENT, Coi mcrs § 151 (1932). See text at note 173 c seq.
28. See RESTATEmNT, CON rncrs § 170 (1932). The statement in the text ceases
to he true as a particular type of commercial paper moves toward negotiability. In the
process there comes a point where a written evidence of the obligation is felt to L2
essential. Thus the REsrATAE! T Section cited states an exception to the general rule:
"If there is a tangible token or writing, the surrender of which is required by an obligor's
contract for its enforcement," then the obligor, to be discharged, must obtain a surrender
of the token or writing. REsTALTEm-NT, SEcumrry, § 1, Comment (e) (1941) introduces
the concept of an "indispensable instrument" which "means the formal written evidence
of an interest in intangibles, so representing the intangible that the enjoyment, transfer
or enforcement of the intangible depends upon possession of the instrument." As examples
of the "indispensable instrument" in addition to negotiable instruments the REsTATEM---ET
suggests share certificates, bonds, interim certificates, savings bank books, and insurance
policies. For a current e.x ample of paper which has probably reached this degree of
negotiability, see the discussion of "chattel paper" in te\t at note 13S ct scq.
29. See GooDapcE, Co.'imcr oF LAws 179 ct seq. (1949); Snu=Eti, Pnx -cnr's cr
Co-cret or LAws 107 et seq. (1951).
30. See GooDaicH, op cit. supra note 29, at 496: "The validity of an assignment of an
intangible chose in action should therefore be determined by the rule of law prevailing
at the place where the assignment is made. Though language inconsistent with this view
is not uncommon [citing cases referring to the la, of the debtur's domicile and the law
of the place where the obligation arose] it is believed that the rule expresscd is sup-
ported by authority." See also Struao., op. cit. Mspra note 29, 245 et seq.
31. See the discussion in 4 ConnN, Co;Tn.%crs § 902 (1951).
32. See RESTATE.mENT, CONTPACTS § 175 (1932). The warranties 6f an assignor
of a nonnegotiable chose are approximately the same as thuse of one who transfers a
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in favor of the assignee the attenuation of the concept of good faith that
marks negotiable instruments law. The assignee may not limit his inquiry
to what appears "on the instrument"; he will be affected by constructive notice
from public recordation as well as by limitations on the assignor's rights,
whether or not known to the assignee.3a
The purchaser of nonnegotiable paper not only receives almost none of
the protection accorded to the purchaser of negotiable paper, he receives less
protection than does the purchaser of chattels. Here the original rules of
property law have stood almost unchanged: equities of ownership are effec-
tively maintained, defenses are sedulously preserved. We have a development
in three stages: the purchaser of negotiable paper receives an extraordinary
degree of protection; the purchaser of chattels gets less, without by any
means being left naked to the elements; the purchaser of a nonnegotiable chose
gets almost nothing. Why should not the development of the law of assign-
ment have at least run even with the law of sales? The explanation lies in
this inarticulate major premise: Negotiable paper is commercial property;
nonnegotiable paper is noncommercial; goods can be either.
In sales law the expansion of the good faith purchase idea in commercial
situations and its restriction in noncommercial situations was achieved by
the manipulation of a set of concepts which did not purport to take "com-
merciality" into account. There was thus no need in sales law to develop nice
distinctions between commercial goods and noncommercial possessions: the
subtle accommodation to commercial needs and pressures was worked out
at a deeper level. In the field of intangibles, however, we find a sharp
distinction drawn between commercial and noncommercial property, between
paper that is negotiable and paper that is not. In the growth of the law there
came in as a matter of first importance the necessity of distinguishing between
the two. Which brings us to that branch of the law of negotiable instruments
called "formal requisites."
The Formal Requisites
Few generalizations have been more often repeated, or by generations of
lawyers more devoutly believed, than this: negotiability is a matter rather of
form than substance. It is bred in the bone of every lawyer that an instrument
to be negotiable must be "a courier without luggage."3 4 It must conform to a
negotiable instrument by delivery alone or by a "qualified indorsement" (i.e., "without
recourse") under NIL § 65.
33. See REsTATMENT, CoNmcrs § 167 (1932).
34. Chief Justice Gibson in Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846). In every
recorded case but one where the question of negotiability has been raised it is the holder
who argues that the paper he holds is negotiable and the adverse party (maker, acceptor
or prior holder) who argues that the paper is nonnegotiable, so that his defenses or
quities may be allowed. Overton v. Tyler is the one exception; on a peculiar set of
facts, it was to the holder's advantage to argue, as he did successfully, that the note
involved in the case was nonnegotiable. Thus Gibson's famous epigram was delivered in a
context exactly opposite from that in which it has been thousands of times repeated,
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set of admirably abstract specifications which, for our generation, have been
codified in Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law and spelled out in
the nine following sections. These rules are fixed, eternal and immutable. No
other branch of law is so clear, so logical, so inherently satis ving as the law
of formal requisites of negotiability. To determine the negotiability of any
instrument, all that need be done is to lay it against the yardstick of NIL
sections 1-10: if it is an exact fit it is negotiable; a hair's breadth over or
under and it is not.
Few generalizations, legal or otherwise, have ever been less true; the truth is,
in this as in every other field of commercial law, substance has always pre-
vailed over form. "The law" has always been in a constant state of fltm as
it struggles to adjust itself to changing methods of business practice; what
purport to be formal rules of abstract logic are merely ad hoc responses to
particular situations.
Nevertheless, the cherished belief in the sacrosanct nature of formal requis-
ites serves, as do most legal principles, a useful function. The problem is what
types of paper shall be declared negotiable so that purchasers may put on the
nearly invincible armor of the holder in due course. The policy in favor of
protecting the good faith purchaser does not run beyond the frontiers of com-
mercial usage. Beyond those confines every reason of policy dictates the
opposite approach. The formal requisites are the professional rules with which
professionals are or ought to be familiar. As to instruments which are amateur
productions outside any concept of the ordinary course of business, or new
types which are just coming into professional use, it is wiser to err by being
unduly restrictive than by being over liberal. The formal requisites serve
as a useful exclusionary device and as a brake on a too rapid acceptance of
emerging trends.
Under NIL Section 1 an instrument to be negotiable must be: (1) a
signed writing which is (2) an unconditional promise or order (3) to pay a
sum certain in money (4) on demand or at a fixed or determinable future
time (5) to bearer or to the order of a named payee. Furthermore, "[an
instrument which contains an order or promise to do any act in addition to
the payment of money is not negotiable."-5 And finally the order or promise
must be one to pay out of the general assets of the obligor; "an order or
promise to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional" 0°-hence such
an instrument cannot be negotiable.
35. NIL § 5.
36. NIL § 3. The NIL statement of the "larticular fund" rule has led to some case
law trouble with instruments signed by trustees, e.x-cutors, and 'aritus types of limitd
liability business enterprises. Also obligations issued by counties and municipalities
which by statutory authorization are payable only out of designated funds have Un
regularly held nonnegotiable. See BIarrux, HItmroox or Tim LAW OF BILLS aNO Xoa'M
§ 12 (1943) for the cases. UCC § 3-105 clears up the doubts about the first mentiunmd
type of paper and makes instruments payable "out of a particular fund" negotiable .vhen
"issued by a government or governmental agency or unit" Another type of pap~r which
fell afoul of the NIL rule was equipment trust certificates, which are often expreszed
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The above statement was an apt description of the types of commercial
paper which were actually in use during the 17th and 18th centuries when the
law of negotiability was taking shape. It is still valid for the mercantile bill of
exchange and the check. But even at the time the NIL was drafted, it had
ceased to be an adequate description of what the promissory note had become.
Historically, the promissory note was a much later invention than the bill
of exchange. The common law courts, which had worked out the elements
of negotiability in connection with the bill as early as the beginning of the
17th century, were still denying them to notes a hundred years later8 7 The
denial was based on the essentially sound reason (if true) that notes were
"not within the custom of merchants," and it took an act of Parliament to
put notes on the same footing with bills.38 In this country, until well after
the Revolution, notes seem to have been regarded as distinctly less "com-
mercial" than bills. In a group of commercially important jurisdictions the
indorser of a note was held to have assumed a lesser degree of liability
toward subsequent transferees than did the indorser of a bill. 9 Despite, or
because of, the fact that the rules relating to the note were relatively fluid,
it became the vehicle for the 19th century transformation of the American
economy both from a cash to a credit basis and from an unsecured to a
secured basis. In the process the skeletonic note of 1800 put on a great deal
of weight.
The NIL furnishes an authoritative statement of how far the law of promissory
notes had departed from the courier without luggage theory by the end of the
19th century. Despite the apparently restrictive approach of Sections 1 and 5
the statute affirmatively authorizes the presence on the face of the note of
to be payable "out of the rentals" received by the trustee from the railroad. Bru-roN,
op cit. supra, § 12. Such obligations have been made negotiable by statutes like the Hof-
stadter Act in New York, see note 101 infra, and are negotiable under the Investment
Securities Article of the UCC. See § 8-102.
37. Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29, 1 Salk 130 (K.B. 1704). For a discussion of some
of the other early cases, see 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 170-6 (2d ed.
1936).
38. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9 (1704). The most pertinent part of the statute reads: "... and
also every such note payable to any person or persons, body politick and corporate, his,
her or their order, shall be assignable or indorsable over, in the same manner as inland
bills of exchange are or may be, according to the custom of merchants. . ....
39. See such cases as Clark v. Young & Co., 1 Cranch 181 (U.S. 1803) ; Mandeville
v. Riddle, 1 Cranch 290 (U.S. 1803); Harris v. Johnston 3 Cranch 311 (U.S. 1805);
Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria, 5 Cranch 49 (U.S. 1809) ; Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch 142
(U.S. 1809) ; Stewart v. Anderson, 6 Cranch 203 (U.S. 1810); Bank of United States v.
Weisiger, 2 Pet. 331 (U.S. 1829) (with notes to the Kentucky cases) ; Bank of United
States v. Tyler, 4 Pet. 366 (U.S. 1830). Most of these cases came up from Virginia
and this type of distinction between bill and note seems to have been limited to Virginia
and the states which patterned their law after hers. Conceivably the perennial riddles of
the law of suretyship as to the difference between a guaranty of collection and a guaranty
of payment and whether an indorser who adds to his signature such words a "I guaranty"
is an indorser or a "mere" guarantor may have their roots in this all but forgotten
distinction.
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many clauses which might seem fatal to negotiability. The note may be made
payable in installments,40 and may further provide that on default in payment
of any installment or of interest the whole shall become due:" The note may
bind the obligor to pay costs of collection or an attorney's fee in case payment
is not made at maturity. It may contain a waiver of the benefit of any law
intended for the advantage or protection of the obligor,4 3 and may authorize
a confession of judgment if the instrument is not paid at maturity."4 Since
it may authorize the sale of collateral security on default,5 impliedly the note
may call for the deposit of collateral in the first place. And since the note may
give the holder an election to require something to be done in lieu of payment
of money,46 he apparently may, among other things, call for the posting of
additional collateral.
The NIL's generous listing of what notes may "give," "authorize" or
"provide for" reflects two key developments in patterns of short-term lending.
One is the emergence of the consumer loan, where the borrower is looked on
as sub-marginal and more likely than not to default. What sort of a person
the new borrower was is revealed by the provisions for amortization of the loan
by installment payments, for the borrower's promise to pay collection costs
and an attorney's fee, for his waiver of rights under debtor-protective legisla-
tion, and for his agreement in advance to confess judgment. The second de-
velopment is the omnipresence of security. Under the NIL any lender may
-and most banks do--write a comprehensive collateral pledge agreement
into the note.
Grant that it is the function of a codifying statute to reflect going patterns
of business behavior and the conclusion follows that the NIL achieved a re-
markably skillful adjustment of rigid theory to flexible fact. Aside from the
special problem of the negotiable note or bond tied to a separate security
agreement,47 there has been under the NIL relatively little formal-requisites
litigation of a type which a better drafting of the statute could have avoided.43
40. NIL §2(2).
41. NIL §2(3).
42. NIL §2(5).
43. NIL § (3).
44. NIL § 5(2). Whether or not such confession of judgment or cognovit notes are
valid in a given jurisdiction is left to local law by the last sentence of § 5: "nothing
in this section shall validate any provision or stipulation otherviEe illegal."
45. NIL §5(1).
46. NIL §5(4).
47. See discussion under headings "Securcd Paper" and "Bonds" infra.
48. The NIL treatment of acceleration clauses has been the only point that has led
to a sizeable amount of what might be considered avoidable litigation. The only type of
acceleration clause which the NIL specifically validates is a provision in an installment
note that "upon default in payment of any installment or of interest, the whole shall
become due" NIL § 2(3). Arguably any other type of acceleration clause makes the
instrument nonnegotiable, and the argument has been made. The cases have gone con-
siderably beyond the statutory warrant. Generally, clauses conditioned upon some ex-
ternal event (e.g., bankruptcy) do not impair negotiability. On the other hand, the
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As long as the law distinguishes between commercial and noncommercial prop-
erty on the basis of form, there will have to be borderline or fringe litigation.4 9
On the whole a continuing trickle of such litigation is not obnoxious; it pro-
duces a clearer state of the law than does the law of sales where the doctrines
say one thing and mean another, a situation not productive of certainty and
predictability.
Theoretically it would have been possible to draft the NIL without refer-
ence to formal requisites. The courts could have determined what instruments
were entitled to the benefits of the NIL on a case by case basis. That ap-
proach commended itself neither to the draftsmen of the NIL nor to those
of the Commercial Paper Article of the Uniform Commercial Code. In both
codifications an apparently rigid statement of formal requisites is followed
by a series of sections authorizing all the clauses generally in use. The only
difference between the NIL and the Code is that the Code, being fifty years
later, carries a longer list of permissible clauses.50 There may well be merit
in an approach which has now been twice adopted by successive generations
of draftsmen. There is little virtue in revolutionizing the law merely to achieve
jurisprudential elegance or an impeccably logical form of statement. If tradi-
tional vocabularly and categories work well enough, it is the part of wisdom
to leave them undisturbed.
Corporate Securities
Between 1850 and 1900 several new types of commercial paper made their
appearance in the market and were almost without dissent granted the major
attributes of negotiability. The introduction of the corporation and its rapid
displacement of competing forms of business organization brought the problem
of the negotiability of corporate securities before the courts. Almost from the
beginning the courts, both English and American, were disposed to concede
frequently found clause accelerating payment whenever the holder may "deem himself
insecure" is almost invariably fatal to negotiability. See Notes, 35 L.R.A. (.s.) 390
(1912); 1915B L.R.A. 472; 34 A.L.R. 872 (1925); 72 A.L.R. 268 (1931). Two of
the rare cases allowing the insecurity clause are Dart Nat. Bank v. Burton, 258 Mich. 283,
241 N.W. 858 (1932), and Heard v. Dubuque County Bank, 8 Neb. 10 (1878). For the
UCC provision on acceleration see note 50 infra.
49. A recurrent nuisance is the homemade note, e.g., "I.O.U., E. A. Gay, the sum
of seventeen dolls. 5-100. . . .", Gay v. Rooke, 151 Mass. 115, 23 N.E. 835 (1890) ; "I
borrowed money from Petros Shemonia, the sum of five hundred dollars with 4 percent.
interest. The borrowed money ought to be paid within four months from above date,"
Shemonia v. Verda, 24 Ohio App. 246, 157 N.E. 717 (1927). They should all be held
nonnegotiable, but not all of them are. See BRIrON, HANDBOOK OF Tit LAW O" BILLS
AND NOTES § 10 (1943). NIL § 10 ("The instrument need not follow the language of
this act, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the
requirements hereof") was a tempting invitation to hold all sorts of irregular instruments
negotiable, but the courts, commendably, have in general withstood temptation.
50. Compare UCC §§ 3-105, 3-106, 3-109, 3-110, 3-112 with NIL §§ 1-8. The Code's
most important change is no doubt its validation, so far as negotiability is concerned,
of all possible types of acceleration clauses. UCC § 3-109(1) (c). See however UCC §
1-208 on the effect of the so-called "insecurity" clause.
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their negotiability with little if any inquiry into matters of form.5 ' Nor,
initially, was any distinction made between bonds, which, in a pinch, might
pass as notes, and share certificates, which could not conceiably ble fitted into
the conventional framework, since they were not promises to pay anyone
anything at anytime but were merely evidences of ownership in a business
enterprise. As it happened, the bond cases came first, where the analogy to
the negotiable note, then in the full course of its own development, was not
hard to draw. Perhaps the early practice of making bonds payable to bearer
made it even easier. Vhen the share certificate cases arrived on the Feene, no
one questioned that what was true for bonds was equally so for stock, and
the formal requisites argument was never raised.
The easy and early common law recognition of the negotiability of securities
did not immediately endow them with all the attributes of negotiability. On
the principal issue-the right of the good faith purchaser to hold free of
defenses and equities-the common law position was a half-way house which
in result, although not in doctrinal statement, approximated what was being
done in sales law under the developing idea of voidable title. The key concept
in the "quasi-negotiable" status of securities was that of "entrusting," the
term having been borrowed possibly from the Factor's Acts. Under the
entrusting rule, the true owner would prevail against any good faith purchaser
from an intervening fraudulent actor unless the owner had himself voluntarily
"entrusted" the security to the faithless intermediary. 2 In this context, as
under the Factor's Acts, the case law defining "entrusting" grew ivo ilved
and obscure: leaving securities in pledge with a broker in a sealed envelop2
might not be entrusting ;5 giving them to a messenger for delivery to a brolker
might be.5
4
51. Two early cases showing the willingness of courts to cnccde the negotiability
of securities, are Junction Ry. v. Cleneay, 13 Ind. 161 (1859) ; Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa.
413 (1856). In Mercer Co. v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83, 95 (U.S. 1163), Justice Grier w rote:
"That these securities are treated as negotiable by the commercial usages of th2 whvhle
civilized world, and have received the sanctions of judicial recosnitiol, ni-,t opy in tli4
court, but in nearly every State in the Union, is well knowni and admitted. But we hav-
been referred to the case of Diamond v. Lawrence County [37 Pa. 353 1 I-A)J I for
a single decision to the contrary. The learned judge who delivered the olpinion of thL Cutht
in that case says 'We will not treat these bonds as negotiable securities. 'Ou tlis trm:d
-we stand alone. All the courts, Anrican and Engtlish, are against ts? " StL' ahF, B-1_1:
v. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369, 377 (U.S. 1870). STEFFEN, CASES oN COMEr .EEAL A.;to %1; :sT-
ME T PAPER 277 (1939) writes: "And from the very first curts \.re usually at&, t.
reach results characteristic of negotiable paper, without much conctrn as tto the e:.act
wording of the bond, though they were slow to say outright that t'onUd wer% ne4%tiaLle."
For a good collection of the bond cases, see Steffen and Russell, 71w Acol.teeility .4
Corporate Bonds, 41 YALE L.J. 799 (1932). As a caveat it should be added that Steifea
and Russell cite at p. 804 n27 ten common law cases holding bonds n r xgcotiabl! oa
one or another premise drawn from the law of formal requisites of twgot:aIie t~a ~r.
52. For a good statement of the doctrine see Scollans v. Rollins, 179 Mass. 346,
60 N.E. 983 (1901) (Holmes, J.).
53. This was the situation in Scollans v. Rollins, supra nute 52. Holmes, althuugh
expressly disagreeing with the result, nevertheless wrote the opinion for the court.
54. Or of course might not. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Net~burger, 263
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The entrusting limitation came up only in actions between true owner
and good faith purchaser where latent equities of ownership were involved.
On the other main aspect of good faith purchase of intangibles-the cutting
off of the issuing corporation's defenses against the original holder of the
security-no distinction was drawn between purchasers of conventional bills
and notes and purchasers of corporate securities. In the early days of wide-
spread and light-hearted stock-watering, the question of issuer's defenses was
vastly more important than it has since become and was resolved squarely in
favor of the good faith purchaser. Somewhat more difficulty was found in
the case of the municipal bond issued under a defective statutory authorization
or for an improper purpose; yet the municipals tended to follow the path
of the corporate bonds.r5
The good faith purchase idea, in its two main aspects of protection against
prior equities and defenses, thus took hold early and established itself without
serious opposition. The common law development was, however, less success-
ful in working out some of the subsidiary rules. The most important of these
is unquestionably the doctrine of merger-the reification of the paper evidenc-
ing the obligation. At common law in the securities field the merger idea was
only imperfectly realized. It is true that possession of the paper-share cer-
tificate or bond-was assumed to be indispensable to support a claim of owner-
ship. Furthermore the one effective means of transferring the security has
N.Y. 16, 188 N.E. 141 (1933) (a common law case), where delivery to a messenger boy
was held not entrusting. Another messenger boy case is Turnbull v. Longacre Bank, 249
N.Y. 159, 163 N.E. 135 (1928), in which the court, in some doubt whether the Stock
Transfer Act or the common law applied, protected the purchaser. ST-rEN, op. cit. s.upra
note 51, at 311 suggests that the result is entirely consistent with the "entrusting" theory.
55. The defense of "unauthorized" or "improper" has by no means disappeared
from municipal bond litigation; nor are results predictable, although on the whole the
defense seems to be disallowed more often than it is upheld. Recent cases holding the
municipality liable, by estoppel or some other theory, are: Board of Public Instruction v.
State ex rel. Tanger Inv. Co., 121 Fla. 703, 164 So. 697 (1935) ; Royal Oak Drain. Dist.
v. Keefe, 87 F.2d 786 (6th Cir. 1.937) ; City of Florence v. Anderson, 95 F.2d 777 (4th
Cir. 1938) ; Pulasky County v. Eichstaedt, 110 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Curb & Gutter
Dist. v. Parrish, 110 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1940) ; Women's Catholic Order of Foresters v.
Trigg County, 38 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Knott County v. Aid Ass'n for
Lutherans, 140 "F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1944); Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8
N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201 (1952); City of Erlanger v. Berkemeyer, 207 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.
1953). Cases denying recovery against the municipality are: State v. Bellcair, 125 Fa.
669, 170 So. 434 (1936); Bloomfield Village Drain Dist. v. Keefe, 119 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.
1941); Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 286 Ky. 119, 149 S.W.2d 738 (1941);
Holderman v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 142 F.2d 792 (5th
Cir. 1944); Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 390 Ill. 48, 60 N.E.2d 552 (1945).
UCC § 8-202 attempts a compromise solution: even though there is a "defect going
to the validity" of a security, an issuer who is a government, governmental subdivision or
agency will be liable to a purchaser for value and without notice "if either there has been
substantial compliance with the legal requirements governing the issue or the issuer has
received substantial consideration for the issue as a whole or for the particular security
and a stated purpose of the issue is one for which the issuer has power to borrow
money."
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always been physical delivery of the paper plus the indorsement by the trans-
feror. Unfortunately the desirable negotiable instruments rule that the indorse-
ment must be written on the instrument itself was not adopted; instead the
practice of using a separate "power" of transfer developed. Eventually
when the "power" came to be printed on the back of the cert;ficate, its form
remained unnecessarily cumbersome. Both the separate "power" and th2
elaborate form of assignment which has remained customary have generated,
albeit to a minor degree, a confusion which could have been easily avoided.
A more serious shortcoming of "quasi-negotiable" securities lay in the
common law treatment of the rights of creditors. For the purchaser to be
fully protected, he must be able to take free of all claims except those of
which he has actual knowledge. In the case of fully negotiable instruments this
is a truism of so fundamental a sort-on a par with "dog is man's best
friend"-that it is hardly discussed in the literature. No lawyer, however ill-
advised, has ever thought that he could affect the rights of subsequent holders
of a promissory note by garnishee process served on the maker in an action
against the payee.50 That manifestly desirable rule was not at common law
carried over to investment securities. The reason for this failure may have
been the appearance on securities of the legend "transferable only on the
books of the corporation." In a wide range of situations it is nece-sary that
the issuer be permitted to treat as owner the person in whose name tie security
is registered. Initially the reference to transfer on the books of the corporation
raised doubts whether such instruments could be negotiable to any decree.
These doubts were resolved in favor of negotiability. More persistent and
damaging was the inference that, since the books of the corporation were so
important, they were the appropriate place for service of process against the
registered holder. 7 Even worse was the idea that liens in favor of the
issuing corporation would be enforceable against subsequent purchasers when
noted on the books even though they did not appear on the security itzelf.03
We shall never know whether investment securities, if left to a common
law development, would have attained all the attributes of negotiability. That
development was terminated by the codification movement. First, bonds were
held to be within the coverage of the NIL, with the unfortunate results which
will be described later. Next, share certificates were promoted to full negoti-
ability by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 9
56. See note 18 siupra.
57. See 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIO:;S § 5109 (1932) stating
the rule and citing cases.
58. See 11 FLETCHEP, op cit. supra note 57, § 5262.
59. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act (hereinafter cited as USTA) w.-as promulgated
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1909 and has since been adopted by all
American jurisdictions. See 6 UinIFOmi: I--vs A%,.,,. 6 (Supp. 1953) for tab!e -,f adup-
tions. Section 22 of the Act defines "certificate" as "a certificate of steck in a corp ra-
tion organized under the laws of this state or of another state whose laV s are
consistent with this Act." The result was that states adopting the Act cintivarcil to
have a common law of share certificates running side by side with the statutory law. (Se
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There have been few statutes which have so admirably done the jot) they
were designed to do as the Stock Transfer Act. It is a statutory courier with-
out luggage-short, simple and uncluttered. Its principal accomplishments were
to remove the several common law limitations on full negotiability: the entrust-
ing rule was abolished ;cO liens in favor of the issuer were invalidated unless
stated on the certificate ;61 attachment or levy was permitted only by taking
possession of the certificate.62 Although the practice of transferring a certifi-
cate by a separate power was recognized, the Act provided that title derived
through the certificate prevails over title derived from a separate document.0a
Also worthy of note is the draftsman's decision to avoid the terminology of
the NIL. For example, the NIL states the rights of the holder in due course;
the Stock Transfer Act reverses the approach and, with equal effectiveness,
states the limitations on the rights of the owner of the certificate who has been
deprived of possession by fraud, duress or mistake.04 By this independent
drafting technique, the draftsman preserved his statute from the danger of
having a host of NIL technicalities imported by analogy. Finally the drafts-
man resisted the temptation to define in terms of formal requisites the
type of paper his Act was to cover. The Act covers "share certificates," but
the task of determining what is a "share certificate" is left entirely to the
courts, permitting a free case law development. The refusal to define "certifi-
cate" is exactly right, although the correctness of the decision is easier to see
now than it was when the Act was drafted.
Documents of Title
The 1850-1900 period saw two other kinds of paper come to market: the
documentary twins, bills of lading and warehouse receipts. Since the common
law development of this "quasi-negotiable" paper ran parallel to that of cor-
porate securities, it need not long detain us.65 Although documents of title
the two New York cases cited note 54 szpra for an example of opposite results on nearly
identical facts in the same jurisdiction.) Since Delaware did not adopt the Act until
1945, and apparently did not have a law of stock transfer "consistent with" the USTA,
the common law continued to flourish for a long time.
60. USTA § 7.
61. USTA § 15.
62. USTA § 13.
63. USTA § 4.
64. USTA § 7.
65. The documentary development was not exclusively a common law affair and
statutes covering bills of lading or warehouse receipts or both appeared relatively early.
Thus New York Laws 1858, c. 326, § 6, an obvious echo of the Factor's Act, provides:
"Warehouse receipts ...may be transferred by endorsement thereof; and any person
to whom the same may be so transferred, shall be deemed and taken to be the owner
of the goods. . . .All warehouse receipts, however, which shall have the words "not
negotiable" plainly written or stamped on the face thereof, shall be exempt from the
provisions of this section." Connecticut copied the New York act in 1878. CoNN. GrN.
STATS. § 3971 (rev. 1887). A Pennsylvania statute of 1866 is to the same effect except
that it covers bills of lading as well as warehouse receipts and adds the flat statement
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had long been known, the law did not attribute to them (except for the ocean
bill of lading) any of the attributes of negotiability until late in the nineteenth
century. 6 Irregularities in the issue of documents have been rare, so that the
matter of issuer's defenses has been little litigated. Mlore important has been
the cutting off of equities in favor of a good faith purchaser when documents
are pledged to secure loans or sold on the commodity markets. Most imp'art-
ant, however, has been the documentary function of controlling the gouds. So
long as the issuer is entitled to deliver to the person who appears on its records
as depositor or consignee, the goods in storage or in transit cannot be effectively
used as security. The crucial step in the development of negotiable documents of
title was the application of merger doctrine: just as the only payment that will
discharge the obligor on a negotiable instrument is payment to the hlder, so,
in the documentary adaptation of the rule, the only delivery that will discharge
the issuer is delivery to the holder of the document. Once that premise had
been accepted, with the necessary corollary that title derived from the ducu-
ment prevails over title derived from the goods, an immense new source of
commercial collateral was opened up.
Negotiable documents have not superseded the earlier nonnegotiable ones.
The seller who ships on open credit terms neither needs nor wants the protection
afforded by a negotiable bill.0U Furthermore the negotiable bill of lading has
that such documents "shall be negotiable." Ptlrzox's Dit;r 165 IS95) (unikr
"Bailees"). 'Massachusetts in 1878 provided that "The title to goods ard chattels !t,,rcd
in a public warehouse shall pass to a purchaser or pledgee by the indor eme'vt and
delivery to him of the warehouseman's receipt therefor. . ." Mxss. Pco. ST.vAs. 419J
(1886). Another variant is found in a Louisiana statute of 1576, LA. ActTs 187o, No. 72,
§ 8, which provided that such documents were to be negotiable to the same extent as
bills of exchange and promissory notes.
The courts did not look on such statutes as conferring full negotiability to the dc.u-
ments they covered. In the leading case of Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557 (1,79)
the Supreme Court had occasion to pass on the rights of a purchaser of a stAlen bill of
lading. The court found it was not necessary to decide whLther the Pennsylvania
statute, supra or a Missouri statute, under which bills of lading -ere made "negotiable
by written indorsement thereon and delivery, in the same maunnr as bills of e.%clange
and promissory notes," governed the ease, since both statutes meant the same thing. The
court held in substance that the statutes were meant to prescribe merely the manner of
negotiation and not to define the effects of a transfer. Id. at 5t2. "No statute," v:rote
Mr. Justice Strong, "is to be construd . . . as making any innovation upion the cm-
mon law which it does not fairly express. Especially is so great an innovatiun as would
be placing bills of lading on the same footing in all respects with bills of eichange
not to be inferred from words that can be fully satisfied without it. The law., has n, t
carefully protected the ownership of personal property, other than money, against miap-
propriation by others than the owner, even when it is out of his plssessikn." Id at 5'..5-L.
The "true owner" of the bill of lading, absent any evidence of entrusting, as l'rutcted.
Thus despite the early statutes, the common law development may be said to have con-
tinued substantially undisturbed.
66. See LLEWELLYN, CASES ANID MATERIALS ON Tan Lxw OF SALES 77 ct xcl. (1931).
67. If goods are shipped under a negotiable bill, the carrier is not eatitled to deli-.er
until the original copy of the bill is surrendered. A seller who is w-illing to trust his
buyer's credit ships on a nonnegotiable bill under which the carrier delivers tW V:h ,nlQ1r
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not yet been successfully adapted to use in shipments by truck and air, partly
because of lack of terminal facilities, and partly because of the extremely short
periods of transit. The owner of warehoused goods may want to sell them
in small lots to several buyers. This can be done conveniently by delivery
orders issued under a nonnegotiable receipt but cannot be done at all where
the original receipt for the full quantity of goods is negotiable.
Thus we find in the documentary field a forked development: although com-
mercial pressures have had the predictable result of introducing the good faith
purchase concept through the invention of negotiable documents, other con-
siderations of convenience and flexibility, not easily achieved under the ordinary
concepts of negotiability, have dictated the perpetuation of nonnegotiable docu-
ments. An odd result of the split-off is that although goods covered by a negoti-
able document become for all intents themselves negotiable, the same goods,
covered by a nonnegotiable document, revert to the status of a common law
chose, less susceptible to the operation of the good faith purchase concept than
before they were covered by the document.
0 8
There were several stages in the codification of documents of title. First,
they were covered by the Uniform Sales Act. The Sales Act sections on docu-
ments go exclusively to questions of negotiability and do not deal with the rights,
duties, and liabilities of the issuer. The same skill at defining by avoiding
definition which marked the Stock Transfer Act is notable in Professor Willi-
ston's handling of the necessary distinction between negotiable and nonnegoti-
able documents: "A document of title in which it is stated that the goods referred
to therein will be delivered to the bearer or to the order of any person named
in such document is a negotiable document of title." 609 Everything else, by impli-
cation, is nonnegotiable. On the central issue of the degree of protection to be
accorded good faith purchasers, the Act codified the common-law entrusting rule,
and did not promote documents to full negotiability.70 For the rest, the Act
covered the familiar isues: transfer by indorsement plus delivery, 1 absolute
title to both document and goods in the holder of the document, 2 requirement
that creditors proceed against the document and not against the goods.7 3
Two sections were devoted to the liabilities of indorsers. Here, as in the
corporate securities field, no one has ever assumed that indorsement implies
a guaranty by the indorser of performance by the issuer: the Sales Act makes
that point with clarity and precision. 74 A less successful effort was made to
is named as consignee, thus avoiding both the running of demurrage charges and the costs
of collection through banks.
68. See, e.g., Quality Shingle Co. v. Old Oregon Lumber & Shingle Co., 110 Wash.
60, 187 Pac. 705 (1920), discussed note 13 supra.
69. Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited as USA) § 27.
70. USA § 32 "A negotiable document of title may be negotiated (a) By the owner
thereof, or (b) By any person to whom the possession or custody of the document has
been entrusted by the owner .
71. USA §§ 28, 29.
72. USA §33.
73. USA § 39.
74. USA § 37.
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state the degree of liability which an indorser does assume-a complicated issue
because a transfer of the document is a transfer not of a money claim but of
the underlying goods. Hence the question arises, not met with elsewhere,
whether the transferor should be held to make to the transferee the warranties
of fitness and merchantability which a seller of goods makes to a buyer. Presum-
ably an owner of goods who is selling or pledging them and carries out the trans-
action by transfer of a document should be held to warrant the quality of the
goods (wherever such warranties would normally be implied). On the
other hand a bank acting as seller's collecting agent in a documentary sales
transaction, with or without a discount, should not be held to any warranties
on the goods or for that matter on the genuineness of the documents. Williston
with his penchant for simplified drafting oversimplified at this point and
attempted to cover the very different problems of seller's indorsement and bank's
indorsement in a single section.7- Except for the happy accident that he soon
received a second chance as draftsman, his too tightly compressed treatment
of a complicated problem would undoubtedly have led to serious trouble.
The fragmentary treatment of documents of title in the Sales Act proved to
be inadequate. For one thing, the Sales Act sections focused on the rights of
holders, leaving the status of the issuer in many respects uncovered, duubtful
and confused. For another, the Sales Act treated all types of "documents of
title" alike. With respect to negotiability and transfer, bills of lading and ware-
house receipts may be regarded as identical and subjected to a single set of
rules.76 On the other hand there are obvious differences between running a
warehouse and running a railroad, and it would be unlikely that documents
issued by such dissimilar enterprises would at all points fit the same bed.
Such considerations explain why, with the ink of the Sales Act hardly
dry, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were already at work on a
full scale codification of documents, designed to supersede the pertinent sec-
tions of the Sales Act.
The Warehouse Receipts Act,- 7 which described in elaborate detail the status
of the warehouseman, substantially repeated the Sales Act provisions on the
negotiability of receipts. The one important change was the addition of a
new section designed to make clear that a pledgee bank did not, by demanding
or receiving payment of the debt for which the receipt was security, warrant
either the genuineness of the receipt or the quantity or quality of the goodb
covered.
78
75. USA § 36.
76. This was done in some of the 19th century statutes referred to in note 65 srspra,
and is proposed to be done again in UCC Art. 7, Part 5.
77. The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (hereinafter cited as URA) vaas
promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1906 and las been adopted
in all American jurisdictions. For table of adoptions see 3 Uunpun Laws A:.-. 6 (Supp.
1953).
78. UWRA § 46. The language of this section and its analogue § 37 of the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act (hereinafter cited as UBLA) was not immcdiatdy succesful in
convincing the courts of what was meant. There had been a pre-cudificatimn Tcuas ca-c
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The Bills of Lading Act,79 which followed the Warehouse Receipts Act,
did make a fundamental change. Both the Sales Act and the Warehouse
Receipts Act had stopped short of conferring full negotiability on documents.
The Bills of Lading Act, hardly ten years later, went all the way.80 There was
no public explanation of the reason for the shift, but the obvious inference is
that, even in so short a time, general commercial understanding had outgrown
common law quasi-negotiability.
No one has ever suggested a reason why warehouse receipts should be quasi-
negotiable while bills of lading are fully negotiable. The Commissioners them-
selves, some years after the promulgation of the Bills of Lading Act, sought
to remedy the discrepancy by amendments to the Sales Act and Warehouse
Receipts Act which would bring both types of documents into fully negotiable
harmony. The amendments met with indifferent success and have been adopted
in only a handful of states.8' The present situation is anomalous and inde-
fensible: bills of lading are throughout the country fully negotiable; ware-
imposing seller's warranties on a holder of a bill of lading taken for security. Landa v.
Lattin Bros., 19 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 46 S.W. 48 (1898). After the passage of the docu-
mentary Acts, the Texas doctrine was abandoned in Texas but followed in some other
jurisdictions. These aberrant cases were mildly criticized in a note in 26 COL. L. Rt;v. 63
(1926). Professor Williston in a subsequent communication to the editors of the Review,
speaking as draftsman, insisted that the provisions of the Acts were entirely clear (which
the COLUMBIA note had doubted) and that there could be no question that the cases
following the old Texas doctrine were overruled. Id. at 330. A "Commissioners' Note"
to UBLA § 37, collecting the cases, refers to the Texas doctrine as "opposed to both
authority and reason." 4 UNIFORIM LAWs ANN. 61 (1922). Since the 1920's the truth
seems to have prevailed.
79. The Uniform Bills of Lading Act was promulgated in 1909. For table of adoptions
see 4 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 6 (Supp. 1953). In 1916 Congress enacted the Federal Bills
of Lading Act, 39 STAT. 538 (1916), as amended, 49 U.S.C. c. 4 (1946), which applies to
bills of lading issued in interstate and foreign commerce. There are a few minor discrepan-
cies between the Uniform and Federal Acts, but the sections dealing with negotiability
are identical. The passage of the Federal Act no doubt explains why the Uniform Act
was not adopted in all jurisdictions as was the Warehouse Receipts Act.
80. UBLA § 31. "A negotiable bill may be negotiated by any person in possession of
the same, however such possession may have been acquired. . . ." Cf. the language of
USA § 32 quoted in note 70 supra. UWRA § 40 is identical with USA § 32 except
for the substitution of the word "receipt" for "document."
81. For the amendments to UWRA §§ 40 and 47, see 3 UNIFORt LAws ANN 104,
114 (Supp. 1953) with tables of adoption. The amendments have been passed in 16 states;
in addition Idaho, for no known reason, has passed the amendment to § 47 without passing
the matching amendment to § 40. For the amendments to USA §§ 32 and 38, see 1
UNIFORM LAws ANN. 400, 405 (1950), with tables of adoption. The amendments have
been passed in 13 states, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii. Maryland and North
Dakota passed the amendment to § 32 without passing the matching amendment to § 38.
The jurisdictions which have amended one of the Acts have not always anendcd the
other Act. Query as to what the law is in Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New
Hampshire, which amended UWRA but not USA; and Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,
North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming, which amended USA but not
UWRA.
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house receipts are fully negotiable in a minority of jurisdictions and quasi-
negotiable in the rest.
Secured Paper
Thus far our story has been one of pleasant sailing on sunny seas. The reefs
and shoals have been by skillful navigation avoided. At common law and by
codification we have ended up where we wanted to go, with only minor miscal-
culations to complain about. But now the happy idyll becomes a Gothic tale
of moan and misadventure. Legal theory broke down spectacularly at what
we might consider to be, if we came from Mars, a point of minor difficulty: a
money obligation tied to a separate but fellow-traveling security agreement,
e.g., note and mortgage, note and conditional sales contract, bond and trust
indenture, equipment trust certificate and underlying lease or conditional sale.
A feature of nineteenth century jurisprudence was a generalized hostility
to security transactions, particularly when the collateral was chattel property.
In the long run the hostility proved unavailing and the cause-whatever the
cause may have been-was lost. But the courts did all they could to throw
roadblocks in the way of the lender who sought to secure his loan on his
debtor's chattel property. This is not the place to trace the tortuous develop-
ment of security law. The general outlines are reasonably well known; the
details await the investigations of the legal historians who, so far, have shown
no great enthusiasm for the job.s2 For some reason-and the writer has not
even a glimmer of an explanation-the device of pledge escaped the common
fate and rode free. Everywhere else the rule was restriction, if not prohibition.
Against this background it is not hard to understand why the courts seized
upon what may have been inadvertencies in the drafting of the NIL as an
occasion for waging still another rear-guard action in the struggle against
security rights. The security transaction is merely peripheral to a loan: one
advantage which any lender seeks is to have his loan in negotiable form. Thus
one weapon in the courts' long campaign against the secured lender was to
deprive him of the advantages of negotiability.
When a loan is secured by pledge, the regular practice has always been to
evidence the entire agreement in one instrument. When a loan is secured by
mortgage, practice has always been to split the agreement up into two instru-
ments--a note and the mortgage which secures it. As new types of non-
possessory security devices have come into use and become institutionalized the
mortgage and not the pledge practice has been followed.
When two instruments are used, it is vital that they refer to each other. The
note and mortgage, although formally separate instruments, are never meant
to be separated in fact: the money claim and the security claim are intended to
be in the same hands. Unless each instrument recites the existence of the other,
the way is open for any holder to carry out what was at one time a not uncom-
82. For an attempt to sketch the background, see Gilmore & A-%elrod, Chantd
Security, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 761 (194S).
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mon fraud by negotiating the note to X and assigning the mortgage to Y. When
that occurred the common law rule was that "the security followed the note,"
which meant that the noteholder alone was entitled to the benefits of the mort-
gage and that his fellow-victim was left to his recourse against the vanished or
insolvent assignor.83 It is surprising that the practice of using two instruments
has persisted: it would have been no more difficult for a court to hold negotiable
a note which contained the traditional mortgage covenants than it was to hold
negotiable a note which contained a pledge agreement. Possibly the fact that
mortgages, both of real and chattel property, were subject to recording statutes,
while pledges were not, hints at an explanation.
At common law the negotiability of notes accompanied by mortgages had been
assumed seemingly without question.8 4 There was little formal-requisites litiga-
tion concerning them,8 5 and the treatises of the time devote almost no space to
83. See 1 HIuLIARD, THE LAw oF MORTGAGES 236 (1872), quoting Chancelor Kent:
"The mortgage interest, as distinct from the debt, is not a fit subject of assignment. It
has no determinate value. If it should be assigned, the assignee must hold the interest
at the will and disposal of the creditor who holds the bond. 'Accessorium non ducit, sed
sequitur principale.' " See also 2 JoNES, CHATrEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES
§ 505 (6th ed. 1933).
84. There were, of course, some aberrational decisions. In Strong v. Jackson, 123
Mass. 60, 63 (1877), the court commented that a note bearing a memorandum that it is
secured by a mortgage on real estate "is not what by men of business is usually denomni-
nated commercial or business paper; and . . . may be subject to equities, when strictly
mercantile paper would not be. . . ." Consequently such a note was nonnegotiable, or
at any rate a purchaser was put on notice of all equities arising from the mortgage.
It may be that notes secured by mortgage are still nonnegotiable in Massachusetts, See
Stevens v. Mulcahy, 261 Mass. 116, 158 N.E. 344 (1927), scmble. California held mort-
gage notes nonnegotiable on the special ground that in that state a mortgagee was required
to have recourse against the mortgaged property before proceeding on the note. Meyer
v. Weber, 133 Cal. 681, 65 Pac. 1110 (1901); Central Say. Bank v. Coulter, 72 Cal.
App. 78, 236 Pac. 956 (1925) (holding that the passage of the NIL had not affected
the Meyer case). The California rule was eventually changed by amendment of NIL
§ 184. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3265 (Deering 1949). Montana, which had the same mortgage
rule as California on exhausting the mortgage security before turning to the note, followed
the lead of the Meyer case. Cornish v. Woolverton, 32 Mont. 456, 81 Pac. 4 (1905). See
also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 48 Idaho 538, 283 Pac. 609 (1929). Otherwise,
except for the types of cases discussed in note 85 infra, negotiability seems to have been
assumed. A note in 32 L.R.A. (N.s.) 858 (1911) collects the early cases.
85. There have been a number of cases where unusual provisions in the mortgage
have been held to destroy the negotiability of the note. Mortgage stipulation for payment
in produce was sometimes held to render sum or time uncertain. Roblee v. Union Stock
Yards Nat. Bank, 69 Neb. 180, 95 N.W. 61 (1903); Commercial Bank v. Crenshaw,
103 Ala. 497, 15 So. 741 (1894). And where the mortgage expressly limited liability to
the property mortgaged, negotiability was also denied. Allison v. Hollembeak, 138 Iowa
479, 114 N.W. 1059 (1908); Kennion v. Kelsey, 10 Iowa 443 (1860); Seieroe v. First
Nat. Bank oi Kearney, 50 Neb. 612, 70 N.W. 220 (1897). Where the mortgage gave the
maker the option to declare the note void, or to delay its payment, the note was non-
negotiable. Hull v. Angus, 60 Ore. 95, 118 Pac. 284 (1911); Bank of Evansville v.
Kurth, 167 Wis. 43, 166 N.W. 658 (1918). And negotiability was also denkd where the
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discussion of the problem.s 6 Not only could note and mortgage be used together
but, judging by the absence of cases raising the point, it made no difference
in what terms the two instruments referred to each other.67 The lack of re-
sistance to the development of a negotiable note secured by mortgage is illus-
trated by a common law doctrine which, although it is accepted in the hornbooks
as "good law" today, has come to be regarded as an anomalous and altogether
queer sort of rule. This is the doctrine that a negotiable note "imparts" its ne-
gotiability to the mortgage which secures it, so that both note and mortgage
pass free of equities and defenses; the holder in due course of the note can
foreclose his mortgage without being subject to the mortgagor's defenses in the
same way that he can collect his money claim by suing on the note.Ys Strange
mortgage provided that the note should be payable only out of funds held at a certain
bank. Shushan v. Trepagnier, 187 La. 1012, 175 So. 651 (1937).
There was also a good deal of litigation involving acceleration clauses, which caused
trouble in the simple note situation, see note 49 supra. In the mortgage cases the accelera-
tion clause might be found in either the note or the mortgage. In the former case, the
principal question was whether a note providing for acceleration on any default in the
mortgage was negotiable. In the latter case, two questions were raised: did acceleration
of the mortgage accelerate the note? did the note remain negotiable? In general an
acceleration clause in the note conditioned on default in the mortgage is no barrier to
negotiability. Where the clause is in the mortgage, a few jurisdictions hold that it do2s
not accelerate the note; in such jurisdictions the notes are regularly held negotiable. The
majority holding is that acceleration of the mortgage also accelerates the note; in such
jurisdictions the note becomes nonnegotiable if the clause would have made it so w:hen
printed on the face of the note. There are collections of cases in 34 A.L.L 8 (1925) and
56 A.L.R. 185 (1928). Two recent cases involving acceleration clauses in the mortgage
situation are Nat. City Bank of Cleveland v. Erskine & Sons, 158 Ohio St. 450, 110
N.E.2d 598 (1953) (note to be accelerated on any default in mortgage, mortgage contained
insecurity clause; held, note negotiable) ; and Barnwell v. Hanson, 80 Ga. App. 73, 57
S.E.2d 348 (1950).
86. Thus 1 DANIEL, NEGOrIABLE INsTRuMIENTs 170 et scq. (4th ed. 1891) has a
short discussion of "Memoranda upon bills and notes, and collateral agreements," but
nothing on the question of notes tied to mortgages. Nor do the many editions of Swonv,
PRomissoY NoTes deal with the note and mortgage problem.
87. After the passage of the NIL and the development discussed in fra the idea
attained some currency that where a note and a security agreement are executed simul-
taneously, all the clauses in the security agreement must be read into the note to test its
negotiability. Except in 'Massachusetts, California, Montana, and Idaho, see note .4
supra, there was little pre-NIL support for such a theory, although Michigan, Broo!ze v.
Struthers, 110 Mich. 562, 63 N.W. 272 (1896), Nebraska, in a series of cases b-ginning
with Garnett v. Meyers, 65 Neb. 230, 91 N.W. 400, 94 N.V. S03 (1902), and Utah,
Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49 Pac. 779 (1897), had so held. The Michigan court
was apparently divided in its own mind, since Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich. S O, 63
NV. 278 (1896) goes the other way. The incorporation idea seems to have died out,
apart from a revival in cases involving consumer installment notes. See discussion in text
at note 125 infra. Nat. City Bank of Cleveland v. Ersldne & Sons, 153 Ohio St. 450, 110
N.E.2d 598 (1953), is a good example of recent case law outside the consumer field.
88. See annotation in 127 A.L.R. 190 (1940). Most of the early cases seem to have
involved the mortgagor's defense of failure of consideration. Elliott v. Deas.n, WA Ga. t3
(1879) ; Gabbert v. Schwartz, 69 Ind. 450 (1880); Preston, Kean & Co. v. Morris Case
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as the "imparting negotiability" rule may seem to modern eyes, the courts were
in effect merely repeating their holdings that a note which spelled out a pledge
agreement was fully negotiable despite the security clauses.
This common law development was thrown into utter confusion by the NIL.
After fifty years of litigation not only has the confusion not been dispelled,
but there has been a net gain in useless, unwanted, and occasionally grotesque
formalism. This needless litigation was precipitated by a section of the statute
which was almost certainly drafted with an entirely different situation in mind
and can hardly have been meant to reverse a settled and unquestioned trend of
case law.
The statement of formal requisites in NIL Section 1 includes the rule that
the promise or order must be "unconditional." Without more, that is merely
a codification of a common law principle: obligations hedged around with con-
& Co., 42 Iowa 549 (1876); Reeves v. Scully, Walk. Ch. 248 (Mich. 1843); Dearman
v. Trimmier, 26 S. C. 506, 2 S.E. 501 (1886) ; Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chand. 83 (Wis. 1850).
Other defenses that were unsuccessfully raised included illegal consideration, Hawley v.
Bibb, 69 Ala. 52 (1881) ; Taylor v. Page, 6 Allen 86 (Mass. 1863) ; incapacity, Hagerman
v. Sutton, 91 Mo. 519, 4 S.W. 73 (1887); and set-off, Duncan v. Louisville, 13 Bush
(76 Ky.) 378 (1877).
The equities involved in the early cases were mainly priority of liens. The issue was
not so much fraudulent conveyance of rights to one mortgage by one person, but rather
rights to actual possession of the land under various mortgages, often with an intervening
fraudulent release of one mortgage by the original mortgagee. Here, of course, recording stat-
utes were a complicating factor. Thus, in Lewis v. Kirk, 28 Kan. 497 (1882), it was held
that the bona fide purchaser of note and mortgage would lose to a bona fide purchaser
of the property whenever the mortgage was not recorded or, having been recorded, had
been released by the mortgagee. On the other hand, in Bamberger v. Geiser, 24 Ore. 203,
33 Pac. 609 (1893), the court held that, since the recording statute did not reqtire the
recordation of assignment of mortgages, the purchaser in good faith of the note and mort-
gage would be protected as against a subsequent mortgagee relying on the release wrong-
fully entered on the record by the payee. And in Wynne v. Admire, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 45,
23 S.W. 418 (1893), it was held that the due course holder of note and mortgage
would not be affected by any prior liens of which he did not have notice. The New York
court in Gould v. Marsh, 1 Hun. 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874), likewise protected the due
course holder where through the fraud of his assignor his mortgage was recorded prior
to a mortgage given earlier. In Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Me. 507 (1859), an innocent pur-
chaser successfully resisted reformation of the deed upon which his mortgage was based,
-where it was shown that the deed had erroneously been drawn to cover land held under
a prior lien.
But some states came to opposite conclusions and refused to impart negotiablity to
the mortgage. Olds v. Cummings, 31 I. 188 (1863) ; Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176
(1862); Baily v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 396 (1863). The Illinois doctrine allowed only
defenses of the maker, not collateral equities. Baily v. Smith was overruled in Dennis
v. Rotter, 43 Ohio App. 330, 183 N.E. 188 (1932).
The case law resistance to the rule in Illinois was later fortified by a provision of the
Illinois Chattel Mortgage Act, providing that all notes secured by chattel mortgage shafll
state on their face that they are so secured, and when assigned shall be subject to all
defenses and that where the note does not so state the mortgage shall be absolutely void.
Ill. Laws 1895, p. 260, § 1; ILL. Rwv. STATS. c. 95, § 26 (1951).
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ditions have always been outside the commercial ambit." NIL Section 3 then
elaborates on the meaning of "unconditional":
"An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within
the meaning of this act, though coupled with-
(2) a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instru-
ment."
The meaning which has been given to NIL Section 3(2) by the case law
is this: any promise or order coupled with anything wore than a statement of
the transaction which gives rise to the instrument is conditional and makes
the instrument nonnegotiable. In particular a note which states that it is "sub-
ject to" an accompanying mortgage or conditional sale contract or otherwise
attempts to incorporate the provisions of the security agreement is nonnego-
tiable because the promise is conditional within Section 3(2).00 The "subject
to" rule has been frozen doctrine for so long that its shaky foundations have
been lost from sight.
If we can force ourselves to read Section 3(2) without doctrinal precon-
ception-as through the eyes, darkly, of a second year law student-it is clear
that the subsection does not say what it is assumed to mean. It is permissive
and not restrictive: it confers negotiability on certain instruments even though
they refer to collateral transactions. Furthermore it is by no means evident that
the section has anything to do with notes and mortgages, or notes and conditional
sale contracts, or bonds and indentures of trust. If a reversal of prior law on a
point of such major importance had been intended, more explicit language
might have been expected.
The source of NIL Section 3(2) was the English Bills of Exchange Act of
1882,91 from which the NIL was largely copied. Section 3(3) of that Act
provides in part that
".. . an unqualified order to pay coupled with .. . (b) a statement
of the transaction which gives rise to the bill, is unconditional."
This language was used with reference to bills of exchange. What the drafts-
man was thinking of was the mercantile bill which a seller draws on his buyer
for the price of goods. In that context the "transaction which gives rise to
the bill" is the underlying contract of sale. It is useful, for bookkeeping pur-
poses, to refer on the face of the bill to the particular contract in aid of which
the bill is drawn. The contract is not otherwise integrated with the bill; it
does not travel with it; holders of or parties to the bill, other than buyer and
seller, will have no access to the contract and will have no knowledge of its
terms. The "statement of the transaction" language, in its original context,
89. See, e.g., STORY, PROMISSORY Nors § 22 (1859). "[T]o make a written Note
for the payment of money a valid Promissory Note, the money must ba payable abzolutely;
and at all events, and not be subject to any condition or contingency."
90. See BRTrov, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES §§ 14, 15 (1943).
91. 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61.
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was an apt description, in permissive terms, of the customary type of notation
on mercantile bills. There is no suggestion whatever that the language was
intended to deny negotiability to any form of paper currently in use. Under
BEA Section 3(3) a bill conditioned on performance of the sales contract
("Pay £10,000, provided that conforming goods are delivered before June 1")
would be nonnegotiable because conditional, but that would have been true
even without the "statement of the transaction" language. No one has ever
drawn bills "subject to" the terms of a sales contract, so that, if we assume
what has come to be the American construction of the phrase, we have the
odd spectacle of a statutory prohibition of a nonexistent practice.
In the NIL the "statement of the transaction" language becomes a general
rule applicable to all types of instruments. Despite the broadening of the rule,
there seems to have been no thought on the part of the draftsman, or of his
early critics, that a major reversal of prior law would result.
NIL Section 3(2) was attacked by Dean Ames on two counts, neither of
which seems to have even a remote cousinship with what Section 3(2) was
later construed to mean. 02 In the first place, said Ames, NIL Section 3(2)
read literally, might, deplorably, authorize any condition to be expressed on the
face of the instrument. Alternatively the subsection might have the beneficial
effect of making "chattel notes"-conditional sales notes-negotiable in
a few jurisdictions where their negotiability had been denied at common law.
But Ames doubted that the language was strong enough to bring the dissident
jurisdictions into line. Judge Brewster, in his reply to Ames, did not suggest
any more than bad Ames that Section 3(2) was designed to tighten up the
rules of negotiability. He accepted Ames' alternative interpretation of the
subsection, as designed to confer negotiability on "chattel notes," and disa-
greed with Ames only in feeling that the language was strong enough to
accomplish the result. 3
Neither the opponents nor the supporters of the NIL, including the drafts-
man, ever imagined that Section 3(2) had the meaning that was shortly at-
tributed to it. It is clear enough that the "statement of the transaction" phrase
had suffered a sea-change on its way across the Atlantic, but all the early
testimony is consistent that the principal purpose of Section 3(2) was to
reverse the minority holdings that chattel notes were nonnegotiable. And
for a time after the NIL went into effect the courts apparently did not con-
sider Section 3(2) to be relevant to note-and-mortgage cases.01
92. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARv. L. Rav. 241, 244 (1900).
93. Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84, 87:
(1900) "The provision [§ 3 (2)] was intended to cover such transactions as a 'chattel note,'
in order to unify the law, which has been held differently, as Dean Ames shows in the
cases which he cites." The draftsman of the Act, CRAWFORD, THE NtGOTIA.LE INSmTU-
MENTS LAW, 12 (1897) and McKeehan, The Negotiable Instrumcnts Law (A Review of
the Ames-Brewster Controversy), 41 Am. L. Rra. (N.s.) 437 (1902) agreed with
Brewster.
94. The round-up of cases in the first edition of BRANNAN, NrOTIADLr IN STRUMENTS
LAW (1908) is instructive. The Iowa court had held in Allison v. Hollembeak, 138 Iowa
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Within a few years the early trend of the case law was reversed for
reasons which are, and no doubt will remain, obscure. Sooner or later the
possibility of construing Section 3(2) restrictively was bound to occur to
someone. The accidents of litigation brought up a few cases involving notes
bearing odd references to a variety of companion instruments, most of which
would have been nonnegotiable at common law without any help from the
"statement of the transaction" concept. Since the statute set one rule for
all types of instruments, it would have been difficult for a court, which had,
quite reasonably, held nonnegotiable a bill of exchange expressed to be "sub-
ject to" a contract of sale, to hold differently in the case of a note "subject
to" a mortgage. The end result was that "subject to" came to be fatal to the
negotiability of any instrument, without regard to what the companion agree-
ment contained or to the relation between the instrument and the agreement
to which it was subject-all this as a necessary implication from Section 3 2).
The settled construction of Section 3(2) at which the courts generally had
arrived by approximately 1920 might seem to have made for a state of
the law not altogether satisfactory but at least stable and predictable. But
the development of the law from 1920 to date has been quite as troubled
and obscure as it was during the first two decades following the promulgation
of the NIL.
At this point we must distinguish note and mortgage, note and conditional
sale contract, bond and trust indenture. Although it has been customary to
lump all three together, both in the cases and in the legal literature, each
followed its own course. The note and mortgage we may leave without further
discussion. The restrictive NIL rule on the permissible limits of the cross-
reference clause, although a trap for the unskilled draftsman, was at least
workable. A lawyer who knew his business could so draw his note and
mortgage that the note remained negotiable and, since the "imparting negotia-
479, 114 N.V. 1059 (1908), that a stipulation on the back of a note that it was secured
by mortgage and that the payee agreed to Iok to the mortgage security for its payment,
became a part of the note and rendered it nonnegotiable. In so holding the court referred
to §1(2) of the NIL but not to § 3(2). The New York court had held bonds negotiable
despite provisions in the trust deed restricting the rights of bondholders. Like the Iowa
court, the New York court cited § 1(2) but not § 3(2). Hibbs v. Brown, K'0 N.Y. 167,
82 N.E. 1103 (1907). The North Carolina court, without mentioning the NIL, had fol-
lowed the 'Massachusetts rule on the nonnegotiability of chattel notes, thus giving sub-
stance to one of Dean Ame's criticisms. Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber Co., 145 N.C. 120,
53 S.E. 909 (1907). Finally, in Thorp v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, 101 N.W. 417 (IM-4),
the Wisconsin court handed down an opinion in a case involving a nute vhich provided:
"The payment of this note is secured by a mortgage of even date herew% ith on real estate.
If default shall be made in the payment of interest, or in case of failure to comply v, ith
any of the conditions or agreements of the mortgage collateral hereto, then the vho!e
amount of the principal shall at the option of the mortgagee... become due and payable
without any notice whatever." Id. at 10-1, 101 N.W. at 418. The mortgage cntained
the usual covnants on payment of taxes and insurance which, it w as argued, were im-
ported into the note making it nonnegotiable. In an elaborate opinion the court held the
note negotiable. Again neither the court nor counsel seem to have felt that § 3(2) was
relevant: the sections of the Act which are cited and discussed are § 1, which is quoted
in full, § 2(3) (on sum certain) and § 4(3) (on determinable future time).
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bility" doctrine was thought to survive under the NIL,9 5 the mortgage too
would pass free of defenses and equities. Furthermore the whole question
of the negotiability of note and mortgage lost its early importance as changes
in business and banking practice made it much less common than it had been
for mortgages to move from the hands of the original mortgagee into those
of a purchaser for value. The note and conditional sale as well as the bond
and trust indenture require separate discussion.
Bonds
There is no reason to believe that the NIL was intended to apply to
long-term investment securities and no excuse for the judicial decision that
it does. 6 Nothing in the statute is even remotely helpful in solving the prob-
lems peculiar to securities. The only effect of holding it applicable has been
that corporate and municipal bonds, equipment trust certificates and the like
have been denied, because of their failure to measure up to the formal requi-
sites, the negotiability which everyone assumes they should have.
In fitting the corporate bond secured by an identure of trust into the formal
requisites, a problem, not existing in the simple note and mortgage situation,
is found. In a public issue of bonds each secured pro rata by corporate
assets, it is obviously impracticable for any specific asset to be allocated to
each bond. The bonds as a whole must be secured by the dedicated assets
as a whole. It early became standard practice to convey the security for the
bonds to a trustee. Equally obvious was the necessity of restraining the
action of the individual bondholder on default. This was done by providing
that no action to foreclose the security could be taken by the bondholders
except through the trustee, and that the trustee should act only on demand
of a specified number of the holders of outstanding bonds. The fact that
many abuses were perpetrated in the name of these "no action clauses"-
which were often so drafted as to make action by the bondholders tinder
any circumstances impossible-does not mean that they were not necessary
and proper: without some restriction on the rugged individualism character-
95. See BRITrON, op. cit. supra note 90, at 66.
96. The New York case of Hibbs v. Brown, cited supra note 94, seems to have been
the first judicial discussion of the NIL in connection with investment securities. The
Court of Appeals held the bonds negotiable, so that the applicability or nonapplicability
of the statute may have seemed of little importance. Typical of the later cases applying
the NIL to hold bonds nonnegotiable is King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 198
N.W. 798, 199 N.W. 437 (1924). The arguments for the application of the NIL to securi-
ties were: 1) while the preamble to the English Bills of Exchange Act describes that
statute as an "Act to codify the law relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promls-
sory Notes," the preamble to the NIL states that it is "A General Act relating to Ne-
gotiable Instruments." 2) NIL § 1 is cast in mandatory terms: "An instrument to be
negotiable must conform to the following requirements"; 3) NIL § 65 contains a
reference to "persons negotiating public or corporation securities." None of the argu-
meats has seemed persuasive to the commentators. For an excellent discussion and collec-
tion of cases, see Steffen and Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds, 41 YALE L.J.
799 (1932).
[Vol. 63:10571088
GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
istic of the widows and orphans who hold bonds, the result would have
been corporate chaos.
At least during the NIL period, no draftsman was hardy enough to write
the no action clause on the face of the bond. Since the formal requisites had
to be met, it would have been asking for trouble to proffer a bond which
conditioned remedies on default on the willingness of a trustee, protected
by the most elaborate of exculpatory clauses, to take action when prodded
by perhaps 90 percent of the holders of outstanding bonds. The no action
clause was therefore put in the trust indenture with a cross-reference clause in
the bond which, it was hoped, would preclude the individual bondholder's right
of action and yet leave the bonds negotiable.
Early results were discouraging. If the reference clause was not specific,
the bondholder was allowed to sue the corporation without going through the
trustee. If the reference clause was specific, the bond was nonnegotiable.07
The desirability of hobbling the individual initiative of bondholders must have
been more important to the corporate issuers than the advantage of offering
negotiable securities to the investing public: most of the later cases involve
reference clauses whose sufficiency to put the holder on notice could not
possibly be denied and whose language would obviously be fatal to negotiability
under the current NIL interpretation. As of 1920 an astute commentator
might justifiably have pronounced that most corporate bonds were not, and
could not be made, negotiable.
The astute commentator would have been reckoning without the intuitive
commercial good sense of the New York Court of Appeals, which was shortly
to manifest itself in an obscure sequence of cases. In 1926 the New York
court -was called upon to pass on the negotiability of interim certificates which
had been issued by J. P. Morgan & Co. The certificates provided that the
holders were entitled to exchange them for definitive bonds "when, as and
if" the bonds were delivered to 'Morgan by the Kingdom of Belgium, the
obligor, and further provided that
"Every taker and holder . . . hereby agrees that [J. P. Morgan
& Co.] may treat the bearer . . . as the absolute owner . .. fwr all
purposes, and . . . shall not be affected by any notice tu the con-
trary."os
Three of the certificates were stolen and came into the possession of The Bank
of the Manhattan Co., which purchased them in good faith and for value.
J.P. 'Morgan & Co. nevertheless refused to exchange them for bonds, because it
had received notice of the theft. The Bank of the 'Manhattan Co. then
sued to recover the value of the bonds.
The issue in the case, said the court, was whether the certificates were "ne-
gotiable instruments." The holding was that they were not, and that the
97. STEEx, CASES ON COMTNRc1.u. AND INVEST MrEN P.rr 251-75 (1939) c, ntaC.
an admirable selection of material illustrating these twin pitfalls.
98. President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 43, 1M0 N.E.
594, 595 (1926).
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Bank of the Manhattan Co. could not recover. The opinion, by Judge Cardozo,
was an extraordinary affair: few of the productions of the great jurist's pen
were ever more charged with ambiguity. It may be that, disagreeing with the
majority of the court, he deliberately wrote the opinion in such a way as to
narrow and confuse the holding.
Cardozo first set out the standard doctrine: the NIL applies to all types
of investment securities; its provisions are mandatory and not subject to
alteration by agreement. The certificates in suit are clearly nonnegotiable:
not only are they conditional promises on a "when, as and if" basis, they
are not even promises to pay money. There remains the problem whether the
provisions that Morgan & Co. "may treat the bearer . . . as the absolute
owner" renders them negotiable despite-or outside-the statute. At this
point Cardozo's language became careful and guarded:
"We do not mean to cast doubt through anything here written
upon the capacity of merchants to create new forms of negotiability
by contract or by estoppel. We do not pass upon the effect of pro-
visions, however phrased, that aim at that result. A right conferred
by statute will not be lost to the holder of an instrument at the con-
flicting behest of a rival, but inferior, body of law, e.g., the law
merchant. . . . The conclusion does not follow that it may not be
qualified or extinguished by the provisions of a contract. See, how-
ever, American National Bank of San Francisco v. A. G. Sommer-
ville Inc., 216 P. 376, 191 Cal. 364."09
The Morgan opinion also notes that the trial judge had refused to find the
existence of a general custom whereby instruments like the certificates in
suit were treated as negotiable. Thus, as Cardozo stated the case, the court
did not pass on the question of negotiability by custom or by contract. All
that was involved was permissive language in the certificate whose object
was "obviously the protection of the bankers, rather than the change or en-
largement of the title of the holder."'10 0
The Morgan case was promptly followed by the enactment of the Hofstadter
Act 101 which overruled the actual holding in the case, while adopting the sug-
gestions in Cardozo's opinion on the possibilities of growth by custom, contract
or estoppel. The Act, which gives every sign of hasty drafting, first defines
in unnecessarily elaborate terms the types of instruments to which it is to
apply. It confers on such instruments the principal attribute of negotiability-
that of passing free of equities and defenses when transferred for value before
maturity to a purchaser without notice. The final section provides that:
99. Id. at 50, 150 N.E. at 598.
The Sommerville case, which Cardozo cites disapprovingly, was not a bond case. It
held that a provision in a conditional sale contract, whereby the buyer of an automobile
waived defenses against any assignee of the contract, was void as an attempt to create
a negotiable instrument outside the framework of the NIL. Sominerville is discussed
infra in text at notes 115-16.
100. Id. at 50, 150 N.E. at 598.
101. N.Y. Laws 1926, c. 704; N.Y. Pzas. PRop. LAW §§ 260-2.
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"This article shall not be construed to limit or impair the nego-
tiability or quasi negotiability by agreement or otherwise of any
instrument whether or not defined herein."10'
The language seems a clear enough adoption of Cardozo's remarks in the
Morgan opinion.
The way seemed clear to hold all types of investment securities negotiable,
whether or not named in the Hofstadter Act, by building on the "negotiabilit,
by agreement or otherwise" language in the statute and on Cardozo's opinion
in Morgan. The Court of Appeals seems to have been in agreement on the
result, but not on the method. In any event they did things the hard way.
Enoch v. Brandon 103 was decided only two years after the Morgan case
and the Hofstadter Act, and while Cardozo was still on the court. The action
was by the "true owner" of bearer bonds against a good faith purchaser from
a thief. The bonds contained a statement that "they are to he trcated as
negotiable, and all persons are invited by the company to act accordingly."
The court spealing through Judge Andrews, prefaced its opinion by a brief
passage denying the possibility of negotiability by custom or contract.
"No such statement will make negotiable a bond not in the form
provided by our statute [i.e., the NIL]. Whether the result was or
was not fortunate, it is too late to argue that the Legislature did not
refer to bonds in its all-inclusive definition of negotiable paper. True,
to become negotiable an instrument need not follow any precise
language [Citing NIL Section 10]. But it 'must conform' to the
definition specified in [Section 1]. In the face of a command su e::-
plicit, we must adhere to the design of the Legislature. American
National Bank of San Francisco v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal.
364, 216 P. 376. At times contract rights may be enforced or some
theory of estoppel adopted, but no intention, no agreement may make
negotiable an instrument which the statute declares to be non-negoti-
able."o
There are several extraordinary aspects to this paragraph. Neither Cardozo's
Morgan opinion nor the Hofstadter Act is referred to. The Sommcrville case,
expressly disapproved in Morgan, is here expressly approved. But strangest
of all is the fact that the entire passage is irrelevant and unnecessary dictum,
since the court had unanimously agreed to hold the bonds negotiable. Cardozo,
it may be assumed, was more than willing to trade the elaborate ambiguities of
Morgan for the flat holding of negotiability in Enoch 'u. Brandon.
The balance of judge Andrews' opinion is a never-surpassed e:ample uf
judicial double-talk. The bonds stated that they were "secured by and en-
titled to the benefits and subject to the provisions" of a trust indenture "to
which reference is hereby made for a description of the property mortgaged
and pledged, the nature and extent of the security, the rights of the holders
102. N.Y. PENs. PROP. LAW § 262.
103. 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
104. Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 266, 164 N.E. 45, 46-7 (1928).
1954] 1091
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the bonds with respect thereto, the manner in which notice may be given
to such holders, and the terms and conditions under which said bonds are
issued and secured." "We hold," wrote Judge Andrews, "that here there is no
modification of the promise to pay, made in explicit terms."100 It was as easy
as that.
Enoch v. Brandon was the turning point in bond litigation. The courts in
all jurisdictions were eager to follow the lead of New York. Prior holdings
denying negotiability to bonds were quietly buried or forgotten. The cases
since 1930 show no desire on the part of the courts to examine the formal
requisites problem too nicely or at all.100
105. Id. at 268, 164 N.E. at 47.
The Hofstadter Act had originally applied only to "security receipts" (the type of
interim certificate involved in the Morgan case) and "equipment trust certificates." After
Enoch v. Bradon, the legislature, making assurance doubly sure, added corporate bonds
to the Act's coverage. N.Y. Laws 1930, c. 630, § 2.
106. There has been only one case since 1930 holding a corporate bond which was
not registered nonnegotiable. Lorimer v. McGreevy, 229 Mo. App. 970, 84 S.W.2d 667
(1935). There the mortgage limited the fund available for payment and the case may be
distinguished on that ground. Cases holding bonds negotiable when the rights of alternate
claimants to the paper were involved: Marine Nat. Exchange Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg.
Co., 293 U.S. 357 (1934) (following Wisconsin law) ; Gerrish v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co.,
80 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1935) ; Siebenhauer v. Bank of California Nat. Ass'n, 211 Cal. 239,
294 Pac. 1062 (1930) ; Sturgis Nat. Bank v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 351. Ill. 465, 184
N.E. 589 (1933) ; Pflueger v. Broadway Trust & Say. Bank, 351 Ill. 170, 184 N.E. 318
(1932) ; Balch v. English, 261 Ill. App. 29 (1931) ; Funk v. Mid-City Trust & Say. Bank,
260 Ill. App. 467 (1931) ; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Detroit Trust Co., 258 Mich. 526, 242
N.W. 739 (1932) ; Paepcke v. Paine, 253 Mich. 636, 235 N.W. 871 (1931); Continental
Cas. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 251 App. Div. 467, 296 N.Y. Supp. 833 (1st Dept.
1937) ; In re Gerber's Estate, 337 Pa. 108, 9 A.2d 438 (1939) ; Pollard v. Tobin, 211 Wis.
405, 247 N.W. 453 (1933).
But when the bonds were interpreted on the issue of the enforceability of no-action
clauses, there were occasional dicta as to nonnegotiability. The cases split about evenly
on the enforceability of these clauses. No-action clause held to bar suit by bondholder
(or mortgage held incorporated into bond) : Gillmor v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 136 F2d
925 (7th Cir. 1943); Dunham v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 106 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1939); Mc-
Adoo v. Oregon City Mfg. Co., 71 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1934); Lidgerwood v. Hale &
Kilburn Corp., 47 F.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Commercial Credit Co. v. Seymour Nat.
Bank, 105 Ind. App. 524, 15 N.E.2d 118 (1938); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Schmidt, 245 Ky. 432, 53 S.W.2d 713 (1932) (bondholders suing corporation which had
paid trustee, now insolvent; mortgage held incorporated, bondholders held not to have
negotiable bonds, hence defense of payment good); Detroit Trust Co. v. Detroit City
Ser. Co., 262 Mich. 14, 247 N.W. 76 (1933) (dictum that nonnegotiable); Mitchell v.
Madison Ave. Offices Inc., 147 Misc. 149, 263 N.Y. Supp. 442 (City Ct. 1933) (not un-
qualified promise to pay) ; Colsky v. Eyres Storage & Distributing Co., 178 Wash. 404,
34 P.2d 1114 (1934); Moody v. Pacific S.S. Co., 174 Wash. 256, 24 P.2d 609 (1933)
(dictum that non-negotiable) ; Oster v. Bldgs. Development Co., 213 Wis. 481, 252 N.W.
168 (1934). In the following cases the bondholder was allowed to sue at law despite
a no-action clause in the trust indenture: Halle v. Van Sweringen Corp., 7 Harr. 491, 185
Atl. 236 (Del. 1936) ; Oswianza v. Wengler & Mandell, 358 Ill. 302, 193 N.E. 123 (1934) ;
Continental Nat. Bank v. Chicago Corp., 283 Ill. App. 64 (1935); Cummings v. Michigan-
Lake Bldg. Corp., 277 Ill. App. 470 (1934); Betts v. Mass. Cities Realty Co., 304 Mass,
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The bond story is an instructive one. It demonstrates the resourcefulness
with which a good court can retrieve a position apparently hopelessly lost. It
is a melancholy reminder of the dangers of bad drafting: the root of the trouble
was an attempt in the NIL, as it came to be construed, to state one rule to
cover a variety of unlike situations. It took a generation of vexatious litigation
to determine that twenty-year bonds could not be governed by the same rule as
thirty-day notes.'10 7 And the solution reached Awas complex and obscure, de-
pending on judicial willingness to resort in a good cause to pretense (that
bonds must comply with the NIL formal requisites), fiction (that they do
comply) and general disingenuousness. Other maxims which the bond story
demonstrates are that commercial needs write commercial lay, that substance
sooner or later prevails over form, and that law, like love, will find a way.
Consumer Paper
The conditional sale first became a commercially important security device
with the fantastically rapid growth of the consumer installment purchase
industry between 1900 and the end of the first World War. For a variety of
reasons the sales finance companies which pioneered the field early abandoned
the chattel mortgage in favor of the conditional sale. The principal reason
may have been that the conditional sale seemed safe from control under the
usury laws.'0 s Another was the advantageous position of the conditional
vendor on default.' 0 9 A third was the freedom of the conditional sale from
filing statutes-an advantage which has now been lost in most jurisdictions.
117, 23 N.E2d 152 (1939); Equitable Trust Co. v. Barium Realty Co., 294 Mich. 167,
292 NAY. 691 (1940); Morley v. University of Detroit, 269 Mich. 216, 256 N.NN. 861
(1934) (bonds negotiable); Bullowa v. Thermoid Co., 114 N.J.L. 205, 176 At. 596 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1935); Cunningham v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 238 App. Div. 624, 265
N.Y. Supp. 256 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N.Y. 671, 189 N.E. 750 (1934) (bonds ne-
gotiable) ; Davidge v. Lake Placid Co., 152 Misc. 307, 273 N.Y. Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct App.
Term 1934); Perry v. Darlington Fireproofing Co., 76 Ohio App. 101, 63 N.E.2d 2
(1945); Miller v. Corvallis Gen. Hospital Ass'n, 182 Ore. 18, 185 P2d 549 (1947);
Scott v. Platt, 171 Ore. 379, 135 P.2d 769 (1943) (otherwise not negotiable).
107. UCC Art. 8 gives full negotiability to "investment securities." .Security"
is defined in § 8-102 as "an instrument issued in bearer or registered form of a type
commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or connunly rccognized in any
area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investmcnt if (i) it is either one
of a class or series or by its term is divisible into a class or series of instruments; and
(ii) it evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enterprise
or evidences an obligation of the issuer."
108. The reason why the usury laws do not apply is that, at least in contemplation oi
law, no loan is involved but merely a sale on credit at a higher price than would Lt
charged if the sale were for cash. For some recent questioning of this basic principle,
see note 120 infra.
109. At common law a conditional vendor who reposscsscd on default too!, the
property as his own and was under no duty to account to the buyer for payments made or
for the value of the repossessed property in excess of the unpaid balance. A corresponding
disadvantage was that the conditional vendor who repossessed had no right tt a deficiurcy
judgment. He was forced to an election between retaking the goods and suing for the price.
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Like any other lender the sales finance company wanted to stand free of
contract defenses between seller and buyer. In this respect the conditional
sale presented certain difficulties which the mortgage did not. A purchase-
money mortgage and its underlying note can be be made to run directly from
buyer to lender: in that situation no one has ever thought that defenses good
against the seller could be asserted against the mortgagee, who does not appear
to be a party to the sales transaction. Or the note and mortgage can run from
buyer to seller and be assigned to the lender: if the note is negotiable in form
the lender will once again, by virtue of the doctrine of "imparting negoti-
ability," hold both note and mortgage free of the sale's defenses. Where a con-
ditional sale is used it cannot be made to run from buyer to lender. A tech-
nical limitation in conditional sales law is that the original vendor must be, as
the cases say, a seller in the economic sense; whatever that may mean, he may
not be a lender of money.111 The lender can come in only as assignee. But
even if the conditional sale contract travels with a negotiable note, the "impart-
ing negotiability" doctrine, universally accepted in the mortgage cases, does not
apply. Why it does not has never been explained, but it does not. Thus by the
use of a note tied to a conditional sale contract, the lender-assignee at best
holds free of defenses on the money claim; his rights against the security re-
main subject to any defect in the original transaction.
Furthermore, looking at the situation as of 1910, it was far from clear
that a note used with a conditional sale contract would itself be negotiable. Only a
minority of pre-NIL cases had held "chattel notes" nonnegotiable."' And
there was impressive authority to cite to the proposition that the NIL was
intended to codify the majority rule.112 On the other side, there was not only
1.10. See, e.g., Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley, 12 Wash.2d 44, 120 P.2d 523 (1941).
Neither the Uniform Conditional Sales Act nor non-uniform conditional sales legislation
relaxes this requirement.
111. The leading case was Sloan v. McCarty, 134 Mass. 245 (1833). In the 1870's
and 1880's there was a flurry of litigation on the effect of such title retention clauses.
Most courts that considered the issue-came out for negotiability. Chic. Ry. Equipment
Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 136 U.S. 268 (1890); Howard v. Simpkins, 69 Ga. 773 (1882);
Collins v. Bradbury, 64 Me. 37 (1874) ; Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 5 So. 627 (1888) ;
Heard v. Dubuque County Bank, 8 Neb. 10 (1878); Mott v. Havana Nat. Bank, 22 Hun
354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880); Mansfield Say. Bank v. Flowers, 9 Ohio Dec. 169 (1881).
But other courts, both before and after the Sloan case, held such paper nonnegotiable.
Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kan. 310 (1881); Wright v. Traver, 73 Mich. 493, 41 N.W. 517
(1889); Third Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 530 (1879). And the minority was
persistent. Aside from Michigan, where the lav was in a state of vacillation for 20
years, see Choate v. Stevens, 116 Mich. 28, 74 N.W. 289 (1898) (negotiable) ; Worden
Grocer Co. v. Blanding, 161 Mich. 254, 126 N.W. 212 (1910) (not negotiable); Schmidt
v. Pegg, 172 Mich. 159, 137 N.W. 524 (1912) (negotiable), the minority consistently
stuck to its position. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220, 218
P.2d 181 (1950); Central Nat. Bank v. Hubbel, 258 Mass. 124, 154 N.E. 551 (1927);
Polk County State Bank of Crookston v. Walters, 145 Minn. 149, 176 N.W. 496 (1920)
(explicitly rejecting the suggestion that the enactment of the NIL should alter the exist-
ing state of the law).
112. See notes 93 and 94 mepra.
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Ames' pessimistic view of the effectiveness of the assumed NIL rule but the
disquieting fact that the early decisions under the NIL showed that the
gloomy Dean was apparently correct.11 3 The NIL had already been enacted
in enough jurisdictions to make it a good guess that it would shortly be law
throughout the country. The chances of success in achieving the lender's
traditional free-of-defenses status under any manipulation of the nute and
contract combination were slim indeed.
Since the largest of the sales finance companies were or soon became
national enterprises, it was of importance to them to devise a scheme of opera-
tion that could be carried out nationally, with as few local variations as pos-
sible. In the stately world of high finance, counsel had attempted to solve the
problem of making bonds negotiable despite the NIL by contractual stipula-
tions in which the issuer "invited all persons to treat the bond as negotiable."
In the underworld of consumer finance, no less astute counsel hit on a similar
idea: by abandoning the note entirely, the desired result might be obtained
under the contract itself. If the trick could be worked, the finance company
would have a defense-free position both on the money claim even in the
minority jurisdictions and on the security agreement despite the courts' refusal
to extend the "imparting negotiability" theory to conditional sales.
In pursuit of these objectives counsel inserted in the contract what came
to be known as a "cut-off clause," by which the buyer waived, against any
assignee of the contract, all defenses which he might have against the sdler.
No attempt was made, except in an occasional freak case,1 1 4 to draft the con-
tract in the form of a negotiable note or to stipulate that the contract might
be treated as negotiable. Presumably for all purposes except that of the non-
availability of contract defenses the contract remained nonnegotiable: if with-
out notice of assignment the buyer paid the assignor, he would lie discharged;
if the seller assigned the same contract successively to A and to B, their
priorities would be determined by the common law of assignment and not
by the law of negotiable instruments.
Despite the fact that there was no effort to turn the conditional sale
contract into a negotiable instrument, the initial judicial reaction was that in
substance this was an attempt to make a nonnegotiable chose negotiable by
contract. An early California case, American National Bank v. So;mncr-
ville,1 15 presented a common type of fraud: the buyer of a car was induced
before delivery to sign a contract containing a waiver of defenses. The contract
was immediately assigned to a finance company, which then pledged it with a
bank. The car was never delivered to the buyer, who sought to plead failure
of consideration as a defense to suit by the bank. The plea was allowed on
113. Worden Grocer Co. v. Blanding, 116 Mich. 254, 126 N.. 212 (lg10); Whaitluck
v. Auburn Lumber Co., 145 N.C. 120, 53 S.E. 909 (1907).
114. See, e.g., Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co., 316 IlL App.
79, 43 N.E.2d 357 (1942).
115. 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923). For the changing attitudes of the New York
courts toward the Sommcr-ille case, see text at notes 99-104 supra.
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the theory that an attempt to deprive an obligor of his contract defenses was in
essence an attempt to create a negotiable instrument outside the framework
of the NIL, and that the NIL was mandatory and all-inclusive and could not
be circumvented by agreement. The waiver clause was void as against public
policy."
16
In a case almost contemporaneous with Sommerville, the Utah court drew
what proved to be a useful distinction. 1" 7 The buyer of a tractor claimed
a breach of warranty and the right, by returning it, to rescind the contract
and recover payments made. The conditional sale contract, which bad been
assigned, contained a cut-off clause. Without discussing the metaphysics of
negotiability, the court held that the waiver was effective where the asserted
defense was merely a breach of warranty and no fraud was alleged.
The Utah decision, so long as a defense could be characterized as a
"mere" breach of warranty, gave the financing assignee protection in the
ordinary run of cases. He was not quite as well off as a holder of a fully
negotiable instrument, whose transfer would cut off even defenses based on
fraud, but, from a business point of view, nine cases out of ten were covered.
In any event, the "breach of warranty in the absence of fraud" rule was,
after the Utah decision, successfully argued to the courts of several jurisdic-
tions, and the barrier of "no negotiability by contract" quietly passed over.
It would be fair to say that, by 1940 the Utah rule had become majority
doctrine."18 The finance companies (now joined by the banks who had earlier
held themselves aloof from such financing) had apparently won their long
116. The Sommerville opinion did leave open the possibility that the buyer might
be subject to an "estoppel in pais," by which the court apparently meant that if the buyer
had stated directly to the assignee, in response to inquiry, that he had no defenses, lie
would be bound to his statement. On this ground it has been suggested that Sonmerille
"far from refusing to accept negotiability by contract, actually sanctioned its use." Beutel,
Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. REv. 205, 222 (1933). The suggestion appears not
to have commended itself to the finance companies, both because it would be expensive and
cumbersome in a volume operation and because, like other lenders, the finance companies
wanted to take free of defenses without inquiry.
117. Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 Pac. 991 (1922).
118. Between 1920 and 1930 the Utah Hall case, supra note 117, stood alone il
giving effectiveness to the cut-off clause, while on the other side Sommerville, supra note
115, was joined by four other holdings: San Francisco Sec. Corp. v. Phoenix Motor
Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220 Pac. 229 (1923) ; Hall v. Hall, 133 Wash. 400, 234 Pac. 2 (1925);
Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Idaho 15, 248 Pac. 444 (1926); San Joaquin
Finance Corp. v. Allen, 102 Cal. App. 400, 283 Pac. 117 (1929).
Between 1930 and 1940 the balance shifted. Following Sommerville were three
more cases: Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705
(1931); Progressive Finance & Realty Co. v. Stempel, 231 Mo. App. 721, 95 S.W.2d
834 (1936); Industrial Loan Co. of Cape Girardeau v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214 (Mo.
App. 1938). Five cases during this period upheld the clause: Colson & Sons v. Ellis, 40
Ga. App. 768, 151 S.E. 654 (1930) ; Elzey v. Ajax Heating Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 281, 158 Atl.
851 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d
908 (1937); Nat. City Bank of N.Y. v. Prospect Syndicate, 170 Misc. 611, 10 N.Y.
S.2d 759 (1939); U.S. ex rel. F.H.A. v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1940).
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struggle against consumer defenses. Moreover, the cut-off clause was not the
only weapon on which the finance companies relied. Initially the clause was
used without a note. It was not long, however, before the note began to be
used along with a contract which also contained the clause. In jurisdictions
which admitted the negotiability of the note, the finance company then had two
strings to its bow. n1 9
Until approximately 1940 the courts decided the consumer cases on general
principles and abstract doctrine. The finance company which had bought a
conditional sale contract from a dealer would be granted or denied its protec-
tion on the same conceptual grounds that would apply in any other type of
transaction. Is the note negotiable? Is it legal for an obligor on a non-
negotiable chose to waive his defenses? Did plaintiff take the note before
maturity, for value, in good faith (i.e., subjectively in good faith) and without
notice of defenses (being under no duty of inquiry) ? The fact that financing
charges might amount to 20 or 30 or 40 percent of the purchase price was ir-
relevant since in contemplation of law there was no loan and therefore no
usury.- o
Since 1940 the solid ground on which finance companies and banks might
with reason have fancied themselves to stand has been engulfed. In jurisdic-
119. Despite the early cases under the NIL and the stubbornness of two or three
of the minority jurisdictions on the point, see note 111 supra, fears that conditional sales
notes would generally be held nonnegotiable were not borne out. Apart from the recent
developments discussed infra, conditional sales notes and mortgage notes have come to L'2
treated alike, and the mere statement that a note is given in connection with a c.jn-
ditional sales contract does not in most jurisdictions destroy negotiability. See Brarro..,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NoTEs § 14 (1943).
120. Before 1940 the only modern cases, so far as the writer knows, holding the usury
laws applicable to consumer sales finance were two decisions of Judge Tompkins of the
City Court of Rochester: Universal Credit Co. v. Lowell, 166 Misc. 15, 2 N.Y.S2d
743 (City Ct. 1938); Failing v. Nat. Bond & Inv. Corp., 16 Misc. 617, 6 N.Y.S.2d 67
(City Ct 1938), Note, 48 YALE L1J. 1102 (1939). The Failing case was reversed on appeal
12 N.Y.S.2d 260 (County Ct. 1938), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 778, 14 N.Y.S.24 1011 (4th
Dep't 1939). Berger, Usury in Instahent Sales, 2 Lxw & Co:.Tzn. Prom. 143 (1935),
had argued that the usury laws should apply, but he and Tompkins, J. were the only
voices crying in the wilderness.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has now announced that in the future it will consider
financing charges within the purview of the usury laws. Hare v. Gen. Contract Purchase
Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952) and Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp.,
220 Ark. 56, 247 S.VW2d 1 (1952). The Supreme Court of Idaho, although adhering
to the majority rule ("a sale of property on contract is in no sense a loan and umury
statutes have no application to such sales"), divided 3 to 2 on the issue in Bell v. Idaho
Finance Co., 73 Idaho 560, 255 P2d 715 (1953). See Notes, 36 Mlimi. L Rsv. 744
(1952); 31 Tax. L Ray. 55 (1952).
It is the Writer's belief that, although financing charges should be regulated, the appli-
cation of outdated, poorly drafted, exception-riddled usury laws is nu way to accomplish
the result. The one direct attempt to regulate rates under a statute creating an admini-
strative agency to do the job has been held unconstitutional by the Indiana Supreme Court
in Dep't of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 103 X.E.2d 029 (1952), an out-
rageous decision.
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tion after jurisdiction hard won positions have been swallowed up without trace.
It takes no special discernment to see what has happened: consumer finance,
at first an interesting novelty, has come to be recognized as a grave social
problem. The finance companies have served an important function in making
possible-at a handsome profit-the mass distribution of consumer goods.
That does not, to the popular imagination, justify what are felt to be prevalent
abuses. It is -hard, and it becomes each year harder, for counsel to explain
convincingly why "the law" requires that a hard-pressed wage-earner who has
been bilked by a now-insolvent seller into buying junk masquerading as a
television set or a washing machine must pay the full price to a bank or finance
company whose own relationship with the fraudulent seller has been intimate,
long-continued and profitable. The finance company must win "on the law"
if it is to win at all. Uncertainty in the law is a recurrent complaint, but here
at least is a situation in which jury verdicts are completely predictable.
The financing institution is in the strongest position procedurally when it
sues on a note, either for a money judgment without resort to the security or
for a deficiency judgment following repossession and resale. Under the NIL,
plaintiff, as holder, makes a prima facie case by introducing the note; defend-
ant then has a chance to show that "the title of any person who has negotiated
the instrument was defective" and it is generally agreed that "defective title"
includes maker's defenses against the payee, such as failure of consideration,
breach of warranty, and fraud; if defendant "shows" defective title, plaintiff
must prove that he, or some predecessor in title, acquired the instrument as
a holder in due course.12' In the usual case the financing institution has no
difficulty in proving that the instrument was "complete and regular," that
it gave value and that it took before maturity. It must further prove a taking
"in good faith" and "without notice." Good faith is said to be "subjective,"
not objective; it is enough if there is an absence of bad faith. The purchaser
is under no duty of inquiry and has "notice" only if he has "actual knowledge"
or "knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted
to bad faith." If plaintiff testifies that he did not know of the claimed defense
and took the instrument in (subjective) good faith, and his testimony is not
impeached, then, by the weight of much authority, he is entitled to a directed
verdict. 22
The crucial question is, then, what evidence is sufficient to send the case
to the jury, over plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict. If we anthologize
the cases, the standard approach by defense counsel has come to be to show a
course of business between the seller-dealer and the financing institution, a
"regular financing" of the dealer's paper. The more contracts assigned by
dealer to financer, the stronger defendant's case will be. Proof that the bank
or finance company either knew or ought to have known that the dealer,
habitually or in the particular case, sold defective merchandise is frosting on
121. NIL § 59. See BRIrO1N, op. cit. supra note 119, §§ 102-104.
122. See BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 119, § 105, collecting cases pro and con on the
directed verdict question.
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the cake. The trend of the cases seems to be that the minimum showing of a
regular course of business is enough to send the case to the jury.123
Not content with allowing the jury to wield the axe, some courts join in
the fun themselves and find for the defendant as a matter of law.12 One way
to do this is to resurrect the abandoned theory that the two instruments-note
and contract-must be read together and to hold that plaintiff would be subject,
on the note, to all defenses that would be good against him on the contractj 25
A more sophisticated expedient, which avoids the problems presented by a
contract containing a cut-off clause, is to have recourse to the doctrines, or at
least the terminology, of the law of agency: the dealer was "clearly" or
"obviously" a "mere agent" of the bank; as "principal" the bank cannot stand
free of defenses on the sale.116 The "agency" approach takes care of all possible
123. See Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F2d 443 (6th
Cir. 1941) ; Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W2d 1 (1952);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.NV2d 260 (1940); Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950);
Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Walter E. Heller & Co. v.
Martin, 319 Ill. App. 209, 43 N.E2d 771 (1943); Industrial Loan & Trust Co. v. Bell,
300 Ill. App. 502, 21 N.E.2d 63S (1939); State Nat. Bank of El Paso v. Cantrell, 47
N.M1. 3S9, 143 P2d 592, 152 A.L.R. 1216 (1943). See also the New York cases cited
note 127 infra. In White System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So2d
227 (1951), the court, refusing to follow cases like those just cited, commented that "steps
to . . . regulate installment credit sales should be taken by the Legislature, and not by
this court in view of the clear provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law." Id. at 449,
53 So2d at 230. The anonymous author of the A.L.R. note to the Cantrell case makes a
"suggestion" which shows a touching belief in the sovereignty of concepts: let the
finance company take the note by negotiation first and then take a later assignment
of the conditional sale contract. "It would seem," the learned commentator concludes,
"that the rights of the holder in due course, once acquired by the indorsement alone of
the notes, would not be impaired by the subsequent assignment of the conditional sale
contract." 152 A.L.R. 1222, 1225 n.1 (1944).
124. See the Orange County, lartin and Cantrell cases, supra note 123.
125. This wvas the approach adopted by the New Mexico court in the Cantrell case,
supra note 123. "Unfortunately for plaintiff's position, however, it not only was a holder
in due course of the note sued on but the assignee as well of the conditional sale contract
executed at the same time and as a part of the same transaction. While no rights
are asserted under this contract in the present action, nevertheless, as assignee thereof,
the plaintiff was possessed not alone of the rights it conferred, but burdened as well
with the obligations it imposed. [Citations omitted.] Under these authorities, the plaintiff
as assignee of the conditional sale contract was subject to all defenses existing against the
assignor." State Nat. Bank of El Paso v. Cantrell, 47 N.M. 3S9, 392, 143 P2d 592, 594
(1943). It appears from the foregoing quotation that plaintiff was sueing on the note for
a money judgment and not asserting any security rights under the contracL
126. Thus in Titone v. General Electric Credit Corp., 201 Misc. 1041, 103 N.Y.S2d
909 (Sup. Ct. 1951), in denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court
commented that a question of fact for trial was whether "dealer was really the agent of
the credit corporation, rather than an independent dealer...." Id. at 1044, 103 N.Y.S2d
at 911-12. The same idea is suggested in Pub. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernandez, 121
N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1952). Several of the cases cited in note 123 supra seem
to be moving toward an agency rationale without having e.'plicitly aduptcd aguicy
terminology.
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combinations: the note by itself, the note plus the contract, and the contract
without a note.
If a court is not willing to stretch agency doctrine so far, the case of the
contract without a note but with a cut-off clause requires the flexing of a
different set of judicial muscles. There are no indications that "no negotia-
bility by contract" is about to be revived and in most jurisdictions the cut-off
clause is effective against defenses based on breach of warranty "in the ab-
sence of fraud." The "absence of fraud" rider suggests the solution. Where
is the dividing line between "mere" breach of warranty and fraud? Is it not
fraud for a seller to unload on an unsuspecting public merchandise which he
knows to be defective? And, if that be conceded, why not the same conclusion
as to defects which he "ought" to know about, whether he does or not? The
dealer is surely in a better position than the consumer to find out whether he
is selling junk. Let the defendant's answer, then, plead fraud. Can it be
doubted that courts which let note cases go to the jury on the proof of a course
of business will let contract cases go over on the fraud issue? Or that the
appellate courts will refuse to disturb the judgments entered on the predictable
verdicts? On the results to date the answer is that it cannot be doubted.
12 7
127. In Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Call Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 442 (6th
Cir. 1941), which involved both a note and a contract with a cut-off clause, the court,
in addition to holding that plaintiff had not borne his burden of proof on the due course
issue, commented, with reference to the cut-off clause: "A note acquired either in bad
faith, or without a showing of good faith . . . should not by the execution of a waiver
agreement, contemporaneously with the signing of the note, be relieved of essential un-
pedimenta on its courier course." Id. at 446.
In Thorp Finance Corp. v. Le Mire, 264 Wis. 220, 58 N.W.2d 641 (1953), where the
buyer who had signed a contract acknowledging "delivery and acceptance" sought to
defend on the ground that the furniture involved had never been delivered, the court
reversed a judgment entered for plaintiff on a directed verdict and remanded the case
for a new trial. In First Acceptance Corp. v. Kennedy, 95 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Iowa
1951), defendant pleaded fraudulent inducement of contract and won a jury verdict in
the trial court, which was, however, reversed on appeal. 194 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1952) (see
further discussion of this case note 129 infra). One of the few recent cases which holds
the cut-off clause good without discussion or dissent is Jones v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 75 S.E.2d 822 (1953).
The New York situation is presently confused; there has been a good deal of lower
court activity, but no clear line has yet been authoritatively taken. It is now customary
in the New York cases for defendant (frequently represented by the Legal Aid) to plead
fraud; plaintiff then moves for summary judgment. There have been three cases in
the Appellate Division: in Pres. and Directors of the Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Asso-
ciates, 276 App. Div. 766, 92 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dep't 1949), the court vacated a judgment
entered on plaintiff's motion, stating that summary judgment could not be granted because
a question of fact was raised by the defense of fraud; President and Directors of Man-
hattan Co. v. Wax, 276 App. Div. 766, 92 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dep't 19,19), was heard
simultaneously with the Monogram case and decided in the same way; on the other
hand in Pennsylvania Exchange Bank v. Kenmore Furniture Co., 279 App. Div. 899, Ill
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1952), an order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judg.
ment was affirmed without opinion, Van Voorhis, J., dissenting on the ground that the
case could not be rationally distinguished from the Monogram case. In the Supreme Court,
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It must be apparent that the writer is heartily in sympathy with this case law
trend.'- "Policy" and "prejudice," taken as descriptive terms, are often func-
tional equivalents. But the development of consumer finance does square with
the underlying thesis here set forth. The privilege which commercial law confers
upon the purchaser in good faith or his alter ego, the holder in due course, is,
always and everywhere, a commercial privilege. It attaches to commercial prop-
erty and to transactions between merchants. Consumer installment purchase is
a commercial phenomenon of considerable magnitude. But from the consumer's
point of view the transaction is not mercantile for the goods are no longer in
commerce; they have come to rest and become mere possessions. The inequality
of bargaining power and technological knowledge between consumer and dealer
justifies the conclusion, towards which the cases are moving, that claims against
the consumer will not, like ordinary commercial claims, he allowed to pass free
of defenses.
The policy of consumer protection defines or ought to define its own limits.
In large-scale commercial or industrial financing there is not the least reason
why the financing institution should be subject to defenses and every reason
why it should not. However, so long as governing law is the common law of
assignment for contracts and the NIL with its supporting case law for notes,
there is danger that the distinction between "commercial" and "noncommercial"
will not be observed and that a technique devised to accomplish one sound end
will be carried over to a field where it could do a great deal of harm. 20 The
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied in Titone v. General Electric Credit
Corp., 201 Misc. 1041, 108 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct 1951), and granted in Nat. City Ban!:
v. La Porta, 109 N.Y.S2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1951). In the Municipal Court, the motion was
denied in Pub. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernandez, 121 N.Y.S2d 721 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1952).
128. It is not, however, exclusively a case-law trend. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania
Mlotor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STar. A::. tit. 69, § 615G (Purdon, Cum. Supp.
1953) (forbidding the use of negotiable notes in connection with an installment sale con-
tract) and the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, MD. ConaE Ali.-.. Art. .83, § 134
(1951) (note taken as part of an installment transaction shall refer to the underlying
transaction and be subject to defenses). See also the provision of the Illinois Chattel
Mortgage Act referred to note 83 supra. UCC § 9-206(1) provides that "[ajn agreement
by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the contract for sale that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense arising out of the sale is not enforceable by any
person." The section goes on to make clear that "agreement" covers both the note and
the cut-off clause, but its effectiveness is somewhat diluted by the fact that the noteholder
appears not to be barred unless he seeks to enforce tle security agreement or attaches
or levies upon the particular goods in an action on the instrument. Of course, there is no
reason why the recent case-law holding consumer financing agencies not to be holders in
due course should not continue under Article 3 of the Code.
129. An example of what, in the writer's view, is an improper use of the technique
is Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal2d 766, 214 P2d
819 (1950), where the property sold was a Ferracute press at a price of $5500 and the
form on which the agreement was drawn up was headed "Industrial Conditional Sales
Contract." On the other hand the reversal by the Court of Appeals of a judgment fur
defendant below in First Acceptance Corp. v. Kennedy, 194 F2d 819 (8th Cir. 19.2),
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owner of a small grocery store or tavern buying refrigeration equipment is not
substantially better able to protect himself than is the ordinary consumer, and
might reasonably be afforded consumer protection. Beyond that limit the cases
should not go, and on the whole it may be more difficult to draw a line between
small and middle-sized business than between consumer and small businessman.
Trust Receipts and Consumer Paper
There is another, and quite different, way in which the question of good
faith purchase arises in connection with consumer paper. Before the automobile
or the refrigerator has been sold to a consumer, it has typically already been
financed as dealer inventory. A finance company or bank has advanced up to
90 percent of the wholesale price, taking back a security interest in the chattel
under a trust receipt executed by the dealer. This wholesale or dealer finance is
carried out at low rates at little or no profit to the financing agency.18 0 But it
should not be assumed that customarily tightfisted lenders are engaging in a
large scale operation in which they will scarcely break even because of a charit-
able attitude toward dealers in durable consumer goods. There is a pot of gold
at the end of the distribution rainbow: the consumer paper, on which the profits,
even after they have been split between dealer and financer, are enormous.
Ordinarily the agency that takes care of a dealer's wholesale finance also buys
his consumer paper when, as is usually the case, the dealer does not have suffi-
cient capital to hold it himself. If a dealer does not regularly offer his consumer
paper to his wholesale financer for purchase or discount, the dealer will shortly
have to make other financing arrangements. Indeed, it might happen that the
non-cooperating dealer would not long continue to be a dealer: the manufacturer,
for one or another reason, might reluctantly find it necessary to revoke his highly
revocable franchise. There are thus reasons of a high order which lead the
dealer in most cases to see eye to eye with his financer. The wholesale financer
understands, however, that some consumers do pay cash and will be content,
occasionally, with nothing more than repayment of the wholesale loan. The
dealer may receive from a competing or pirate financing agency an offer of a
kickback on the consumer paper so attractive that he would have to be more
than human, and many dealers are not, to close his ears. In any case it does
happen that Finance Co. B sometimes shows up as owner, holder, and good
faith purchaser of paper which Finance Co. A, the wholesale financer, also
claims as its own-the dealer being now bankrupt and the true situation
having come to light.' 13
was entirely proper: involved in that case was the sale of air conditioning equipment
at a price of over $8,000 to a large-scale grower of onions.
UCC § 9-206(2) validates the waiver of defenses by a buyer, by cut-off clause or by
the execution of a negotiable note, in all cases outside the consumer field.
130. See Note, Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance, 60 YALE L.J. 1218,
1223 n.17 (1951).
131. It has always been a peculiarity of trust receipt law that the entruster's security
interest shifts automatically from the original collateral to the proceeds arising from sale.
This is codified in Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 10 (hereinafter cited as UTRA).
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The legal situation under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is far from simple.
That Act provides for filing of the security interest of the lender-entruster; in
wholesale finance that filing is regularly made. But the Act does not protect
the filing entruster against all subsequent purchasers of the collateral or its
proceeds. Despite the filing the "buyer in ordinary course of trade"--i.e.,
the consumer himself-takes free of the entruster's interest.1 a Furthermore,
Section 9(1) (a) of the Act provides:
"Nothing in this act shall limit the rights of purchasers in good
faith and for value from the trustee [i.e., the borrower] of negotiable
instruments or negotiable documents, and purchasers taking from the
trustee for value, in good faith, and by transfer in the customary
manner instruments in such form as are by common practice pur-
chased and sold as if negotiable, shall hold such instruments free of
the entruster's interest; and filing under this act shall not be deemed
to constitute notice of the entruster's interest to purchasers in good
faith and for value of such documents or instruments, other than
transferees in bulk."
The term "instrument" carries a statutory definition much wider than might
be expected: it covers not only negotiable instruments as defined in the NIL
but also certificates of stock, bonds, and debentures, and finally "any interim,
deposit or participation certificate or receipt, or other credit or investment in-
strument of a sort marketed in the ordinary course of business or finance, of
which the trustee, after the trust receipt transaction appears by virtue of
possession and the face of the instrument to be the owner.",1
The foregoing provisions of the Trust Receipts Act are less than crystal
dear. Section 9(1) (a) is of extraordinary interest: it makes filing under the
Act ineffective as notice against good faith purchasers of (a) negotiable instru-
ments; (b) negotiable documents (i.e., bills of lading and warehouse receipts);
and (c) instruments in such form as are "by common practice" purchased
and sold "as if" negotiable, provided the instrument is taken "by transfer, in
the customary manner"--presumably by indorsement and delivery. The Act
contemplates that there can be types of instruments in addition to those
strictly negotiable which will pass free of the entruster's security interest in
the case of good faith purchase. The statutory insistence on the "manner" of
transfer (assuming that to mean by indorsement and delivery) suggests that
an instrument which by practice is so transferred is an instrument, which is
being treated "as if" it were negotiable.
Does the "as if" negotiable category include a conditional sale contract taken
by a dealer on sale of a car subject to a trust receipt? A "customary" manner
of transferring such paper is by indorsement and delivery, so that, if the
interpretation suggested in the preceding paragraph is sound, the answer is
Yes. On the other hand, the statutory definition of "instrument," fairly read,
fits long term investment paper better than short-term consumer paper, and
132. UTRA §9(2) (a).
133. UTRA § 1.
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may have been designed to make clear that bonds, interim certificates and the
like which might not in a given jurisdiction be technically negotiable, would,
as the subject matter of a trust receipt transaction, pass free of the entruster's
interest. Nevertheless, it is possible to fit the conditional sale contract under
the instrument definition as a "credit . . . instrument of a sort marketed in
the ordinary course of business or finance of which the trustee, after the trust
receipt transaction, appears by virtue of possession and the face of the instru-
ment to be the owner." A reasonably prudent lawyer, if such there be, might
not be too far off if he concluded that the arguments are almost evenly
balanced.
Although the Trust Receipts Act has been in force in many commercially-
important jurisdictions for nearly twenty years and although a vast volume
of financing is carried out under it, there has been almost no authoritative
judicial construction of its obscure terminology.134 It is interesting that the
question of the relative rights of the entruster and a good faith purchaser of
a conditional sale contract resulting from the sale of the entrusted collateral
has already been several times before the courts.'13  These cases have come up
during the period when, in the consumer defense cases, the clear trend has
been to deny the cutting off of defenses. "Defenses" and "equities" have
traditionally been treated alike. It might be reasonable to expect that the
courts, which have been industriously denying that conditional sale contracts
were negotiable or could be made so by contractual stipulation where defenses
were involved, would do the same thing for equities of ownership. Some
courts have done exactly that.1 6 On the whole, however, the results to date
134. The absence of litigation is explained by two factors: 1) since the late 1930's
when the Act went into effect in most jurisdictions, business has been generally good;
2) after 1943 there was reason to believe that all trust receipts were vulnerable to
attack as voidable preferences under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act as construed in Corn
Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), and consequently
those engaged in trust receipt financing deliberately refrained from litigation until § 60
was amended in 1950 in their favor. Since the amendment to § 60 the log-jam seems
to have broken; there have been almost as many trust receipt cases during the pa'st two
or three years as there had been in the previous fifteen.
135. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal.App.2d 729, 137 P.2d
729 (1943) ; North American Acceptance Corp. v. Northern Illinois Corp., 347 111. App.
89, 106 N.E.2d 197 (1952); Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank of Petersburg,
224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E.2d 28 (1945); Farmers Nat. Bank of Amsterdam v. Universal
Credit Co., 259 App. Div. 955, 20 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (3d Dep't 1940), reargyinent and leave
to appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 816, 22 N.Y.S.2d 532 (3d Dep't 1940), leave to appeal
denied, 284 N.Y. 818, 29 N.E.2d 975 (1940); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Asso-
ciates Discount Corp., 38 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Mun. Ct. 1942), rev'd, 267 App. Div. 1032, 48
N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1944), motion for reargunnent and leave to appeal denied, 268
App. Div. 820, 50 N.Y.S.2d 336 (4th Dep't 1944) ; Citizens Nat. Bank of Springville v.
Conger, 176 Misc. 1048, 29 N.Y.S.2d 65 (County Ct. 1941).
136. The lower court so held in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Associates
Discount Corp., 38 N.Y.S.2d 972, 978 (Mun. Ct. 1942), although on another theory
the court protected the purchaser; on appeal the case was reversed on other grounds, 267
App. Div. 1032, 48 N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1944). Two other recent cases involving
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have been inconclusive. In the trust receipt cases, there has been no square
holding that the resulting conditional sale contracts pass free of equities under
the "as if negotiable" language of the Act. On the other hand the purchaser
of the contract has been protected against the wholesale financer quite as often
as he has lost to him.13 7 On the cases alone, it would take a more than eagle-
eyed observer to declare a trend. The courts are hesitating here, as they are
not in the consumer cases, inarticulately feeling, it may be, that the reason
which leads them to preserve the consumer defense does not justify the same
result in the equity cases.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code resolves the presently confused
state of the law squarely in favor of the negotiability of such "chattel paper."' 9
Under Article 9, as under the Trust Receipts Act, a lender who finances a
dealer's inventory has a continuing security interest in the chattel paper or
"proceeds" which result from sale of the original collateral. Section 9-30r)(4)
provides that, where a secured party has a claim to chattel paper as proceeds
"... nothing in this section prevents a transfer thereof for new
value in the ordinary course of business, and the security interest or
any other right of any such transferee shall have priority over the
security interest based on a claim to proceeds. .. "
The quoted provision goes much further than the Trust Receipts Act, even
if chattel paper is assumed to fall under the "as if negotiable" category in
the earlier Act. The Trust Receipts Act provided that purchasers "in good
faith" should take free of the entruster's interest and that filing under the Act
should not constitute "notice." The references to "good faith" and "nolice"
make it clear that a purchaser with actual knowledge of the entruster's security
interest would not be protected. Under the Code the criteria for protection
are "new value" and purchase "in the ordinary course of lwiness." Thus
where the chattel paper is proceeds of inventory originally subject to a security
interest, even a purchaser who knew of the claim to the paper as proceel.
would be protected, provided he gave new value in the ordinary course of
business.
The Code also recognizes the "negotiability" of chattel paper where a se-
cured party 13 has not merely a claim to it as proceeds but has taken a
specific assignment of the paper. One widely practiced form of financing is
equities, on factual situations somewhat different from Associates Discont, in xhich
courts have had occasion to reiterate that conditional sale cntracts are nut n' aetiahle
instruments, are Howard Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 243 SAV.2d 305 (Mo. Sup. Ct.
1951) and General 'Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220, 218 P.2d 181 (19EO).
137. In the cases cited note 135 szfpra the entruster won in the Conecr case, and the
North American Acceptance Corp. case; the purchaser won in the Anistcrdam Ban!:
case, the Associates Discont case (in the trial court, revkrsed .on aplal on other
grounds), and the Bow'mnan case. In the Petersburgj Ban!: case, the entrustkr V.,n on
some of the contracts involved and lost on others.
138. The term is defined in UCC § 9-105.
139. " 'Secured party' means a lender, seller or other persun in whose favor there is
a security interest ... ." UCC § 9-105.
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for the paper, after assignment, to be left in the dealer's possession for him
to continue making collections from the buyer, who is not notified that there
has been an assignment. This is known as "non-notification" financing, or
"indirect collection," in contrast to the practice usually followed, for example,
in automobile financing where the paper is physically transferred to the as-
signee who notifies the obligor of the assignment and proceeds to make collec-
tions "directly" from him. The indirect collection method is widely used
in the household appliance field-even though, in the present state of the law,
counsel would have to be very brave or very foolish to give an unqualified
opinion on the rights of the assignee who leaves such paper in the assignor's
possession for collection. Since the practice itself is of relatively recent origin,
there is no case law that is helpful as authority or precedent. It is entirely
possible that, as to the hundreds of millions of dollars of paper handled each
year on an "indirect collection" method, the assignees have no security inter-
est that would be effective either against the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy
or against subsequent purchasers of the paper from the assignor.
The Code recognizes the "indirect collection" practice and permits the
assignee who is not in possession to file a statement which will protect him
against the dealer's trustee in bankruptcy. 140 Despite the filing a purchaser
for new value and in the ordinary course of business who takes possession
of the paper and who does not have "actual knowledge" of the prior interest
takes free of the earlier assignee's equity.
A summary will point up the moral. Before the NIL, some jurisdictions had
denied negotiability to "chattel notes." A provision of the NIL, apparently
intended to overrule such holdings, did not immediately have that effect. The
consumer finance industry, which had turned to the conditional sale as its
chosen security device, sought to achieve the substance of negotiability by
waiver of defense clauses. In time such clauses came to be recognized as valid
"in the absence of fraud"; the negotiability of the conditional sales note also
came to. be generally admitted. A reverse trend has manifested itself during
the past fifteen or twenty years. By case law and under regulatory statutes,
the consumer's defenses against a financing assignee are now being preserved,
despite the use of notes admitted to be fully negotiable and in jurisdictions
recognizing the validity of waiver of defense clauses. But where equities of
ownership in consumer paper are involved-as on transfer from dealer to
successive assignees-there is a contrasting movement towards a state of
limited negotiability.
The story is one of complex, shifting cross-currents. Stability in any field
of commercial law depends on a stable business practice. In earlier parts of
this discussion we traced the smooth and uncomplicated growth toward nego-
tiability of various types of commercial paper in areas where practice, once
fixed, has not thereafter varied. Here the business background has been in a
continuing state of dynamic flux. From nothing, in less than fifty years, has
grown an enterprise which accounts for an annual business of billions of dollars.
140. UCC § 9-308.
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The legal zig-zags which have accompanied the growth show the law, not at
its worst, but at its best in adapting to novel problems despite the necessity
of maintaining the pretense of an unchanging continuity.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
According to a well-worn epigram we learn nothing from history except
that we learn nothing from history. If, however, such learning were possible,
future developments might take place with less grinding of gears. The lav.
will continue to make, regardless of precedents and statutes, the necessary
accommodation to changing practice. There must be a time lag in adjusting
to a new way of doing business; just as it took a few years or more for the
law to recognize that an automobile (although it has four wheels) is not in
all respects like a horse (which has four legs). But, admitting the time lag,
the adjustment can be made with relative ease and at little cost; or it can he
made roughly and at the cost of a great deal of litigation. The more readily
we can accept, as a basic proposition, that the corpus of the law is a floating
mass and not a solid body, the more easily will the necessary changes be made,
and, paradoxically, the greater will be the real, as distinguished from the
apparent, certainty.
The Commercial Code has been enacted in Pennsylvania and is presently
under legislative consideration in many other states. Over the next ten years
it may well supersede our present commercial statutes in enough important
jurisdictions to insure its general adoption. Assuming that outcome, which
is not unlikely, we are again in the situation which confronted the legal pro-
fession fifty years ago at the time of the first general codification. Our review
of that experience may be helpful in determining a state of mind which will
make it easier to avoid the same types of mistakes a second time.
Common law extensions of the good faith purchase idea were accomplished
with extraordinary ease. When the statutes came, they were successful will
respect to those types of property which had reached a mature stage of develop-
ment. The documentary Acts, the Stock Transfer Act and the NIL, with
respect to mercantile bills and checks and even the expanding collateral pl:de
note, served a useful function well. Trouble came when the NIL was souught
to be used as a strait-jacket to confine young members of the family who
refused to conform to accepted ideas of proper behavior. The attempt to con-
fine left behind it, as its most undesirable consequence, the idea that un, h:r
a codified law there can be no further growth.
It is devoutly to be hoped that the negotiability by contract controverv will
not be repeated under the Code. Under the NIL the formal basis for the
argument that there could be no "negotiability" outside the statute was
the all-inclusive coverage suggested by the preamble and the mandatory
language of the first sentence of Section 1. On both counts the Code mal:e3
the argument more difficult to support. Article 3 of the Code, designed to
replace the NIL, is entitled "Commercial Paper," which seems considerably
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to narrow the field. The statement of formal requisites contained in Section
3-104 provides that:
"Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article
must .... .
This repeats the langauge of NIL Section 1 with the significant addition
of the phrase "within this Article." The clear implication is that there may
be instruments having some or all of the attributes of negotiability-the term
is not defined in the Code any more than it was in the NIL-outside the
Article.
Within its own limits Article 3 is a tight statute. Section 3-104 provides
in part that a writing to be a negotiable instrument "within this Article" must
"contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and
no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer
except as authorized by this Article." The statutory text is reinforced by a
comment which states that "a writing cannot be made a negotiable instrument
within this Article by contract or conduct," 141 although common law principles
of estoppel may justify a finding that a defense is cut off in a particular case.
Furthermore, NIL Section 10, which provided that an instrument need not
follow the language of the Act if it "clearly indicates an intention to conform,"
has been deleted from the Code, with the comment that "the provision has
served no useful purpose and . . . has been an encouragement to bad drafting
and to liberality in holding questionable paper to be negotiable."' 4 2
Since Article 3 is a statute of limited coverage and governs only types of
paper which have reached a tranquil old age in which further growth appears
to be impossible, the "tightness" of the approach seems reasonable. Care must
be taken, however, that the strict approach is confined to the limits of Article
3. As to emerging types of paper, it is to be hoped that the freewheeling
approach of the nineteenth century courts will, under the stimulus of such
open-ended definitions as those of "security"' 143 and "chattel paper,"'1'4 replace
the cramped and technical attitude into which too many of the early NIL
courts fell.
145
Letters of Credit
Signs of change are already manifest in some areas of commercial financing.
One such area is the commercial letter of credit. Simply stated, a letter of
141. UCC § 3-104, Comment 2.
142. UCC § 3-104, Comment 5.
143. UCC § 8-102.
144. UCC § 9-105.
145. The writer must respectfully disagree on this point with Professor Britton, who
concludes that the "within this Article" language of UCC § 3-104 "invite[s] courts to
confer upon various nonconforming writings, some of many attributes of negotiability, is
thoroughly unsound . . . [and] should be struck from the Code." Britton, Formal
Requisites of Negotiablity--The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared with the Pro-
posed Commercial Code, 26 RocKy MT. L. REv. 1, 32 (1953).
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credit is a promise given by a financing agency, on behalf of a buyer of gooids,
to the seller providing that the financing agency will pay the purchase price
by honoring drafts drawn on it when accompanied by specified shipping docu-
ments. There are great advantages to both seller and buyer in letter of credit
financing. The seller receives a bank's promise to pay and therefure need
not rely on, or investigate, a distant buyer's credit standing: the bank has dune
that before issuing the credit. He is assured of getting his money as soon as
he has assembled the required documents evidencing the shipment. The bank
will not be excused from honor of the drafts by allegation-or proof-that the
goods shipped are nonconforming :14O thus litigation on breach of warranty will
be localized in the seller's forum and a fraudulently inclined buyer will not be
able to whipsaw a seller into letting goods go at half their price on false allega-
tions of defective quality.' 47 The buyer who can establish a letter of credit
in his seller's favor needs no further proof of his own credit standing; and
since the issuing bank, on honoring the seller's drafts, automatically gets a
security interest in the goods through possession of the bill of lading, the
transaction is, in the absence of fraud or sudden market breaks, self-liquidating.
From a seller's point of view, a letter of credit would be even more valuable
than it is if he could use it in financing his own procurement of the goods or
raw materials with which he will perform his contract of sale. That could
be done if, as beneficiary of the letter, he could make an effective assignment
of proceeds in the same way that a contractor assigns moneys to become due
under a construction or production contract. Since the idea of free as.ign-
ability is the lifeblood of the banking business, one might expect to find the
bankers in a receptive, even a cooperative attitude. The expectation would lie
disappointed.14 S It is the nearly unanimous opinion of banking groups that
146. The leading case is Maurice O'Meara Co. v. Nat. Park Dank of N.Y., 239 N.Y.
386, 146 N.F 636 (1925) (bank required to honor drafts, in the hands of a holder not in
due course, even though goods nonconforming). Cf., however, Sztejn v. J. Henry
Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (xvhre
"cowhair, other worthless material and rubbish" were shipped instead of bristles, and
drafts were not in hands of holder in due course, buyer's action to restrain issuing bV,.m
from honoring drafts will not be dismissed). The distinction between 03'cara and S.ctci,
is the "distinction between a breach of warranty and active fraud on the part uf the
seller." Id. at 722, 31 N.Y.S2d at 635. UCC § 5-111 codifies both the O'Mcara rule and
the Sztcjn limitation on it.
147. Of course, if the seller fails to assemble a proper set of shipping documents
(and a rule of perfect tender is strictly enforced) the bank, acting presumably in ac-
cordance with the wishes of its customer the buyer, is entitk'd to reject. For an interes ting
case in which the seller shipped conforming goods but failed to get the documents right
and consequently had to dispose of the goods to the original buyer at a heavy loss, see Bank f
Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1952).
14S. The point should be made that the banks have worked out procedures under
which the seller-beneficiary can get "secondary financing," as it is calkd, by paying a
second bank fee and having a second credit issued "back to back" with the first (the same
shipping documents being required under both credits). Kingdom of SV-Cden V. NXLW
York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1949), cuntains an excelknt
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no assignment of proceeds of a letter of credit in favor of a third person
should be valid against a bank without the bank's consent.1 49 The distinction
between an assignment to a bank (e.g., of money to become due under a pro-
duction contract) and an assignment against a bank (e.g., of money to become
due under a letter of credit) is easier for a banker than for a merchant to
understand.
If we speak loosely of the "assignment of a credit" any one of several types
of transfer may be meant:
(1) The assignment of the right to draw under the credit: after such
assignment, the bank would be required to honor drafts drawn by and docu-
ments presented by the assignee of the original beneficiary (seller) of the
letter.
(2) The assignment of the proceeds of the letter: the drafts would still
have to be drawn and the documents presented by the original beneficiary, but,
after having received notice of the assignment, the bank would be required
to pay the assignee.
(3) The negotiation of drafts drawn under the letter to one claiming as
a holder in due course with the right to stand free of defenses which might be
available to the bank (or its customer the buyer) against the seller-beneficiary.
Banking opinion is that neither an assignment of the right to draw under
a letter nor an assignment of the proceeds of a letter is effective without the
issuing bank's consent and that only other banks (known as negotiating
banks) can ever qualify as holders in due course of drafts-and then only
under certain types of credits. It is suggested that the bankers are correct
as to the right to draw (although the power to give or withhold consent
should be in the bank's customer and not in the bank), 150 wrong on policy (at
least as to assignments made within the United States) as to the assignment
and detailed description of the mechanics of the back-to-back credit. On this and other
bank-approved methods of secondary financing, see WARD AND HARFiLD, BANK CREDITS
AND ACCEPTANCES C. 9 (3rd ed. 1948) and Harfield, Secondary Uses of Commercial
Credits, 44 CoL L. REv. 899 (1944).
149. Statements about group opinion made without (or even with) a scientific study
of the group are of course hazardous. As a member of the drafting staff for the UCC,
the writer participated in numerous conferences in which banking representatives set
forth their opinions on the various drafts of Article 5 of the Code (Documentary Letters
of Credit). The statement in the text is based in part on his experience at those con-
ferences. Current American banking opinion, the writer believes, is faithfully reflected
in the assignment provisions of the UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTIc FOR COMMERCIAL
DOCUMENTARY CEDITS (Brochure No. 151, Int'l Chamber of Commerce 1951) and those
of the final draft of UCC Art. 5, both discussed in!ra. The leading American text ol
letters of credit, WARD & HARFIELD, op. cit. supra note 143, written by eminent bank
counsel, takes a position on assignment questions somewhat at variance with what this
writer believes to be majority banking opinion. Their position in some respects is not
far removed from that adopted in the following discussion. See generally WARD & HA,-
FIELD, op. cit. supra, c. 9 for an excellent presentation of assignment problems.
150. Cf. WARD & HARFIELD, op. cit. supra note 148, at 131-2.
[Vol. 63 :10571110
GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
of proceeds, 151 and wrong on the law as to negotiation of drafts to holders
other than banks.
1
5
2
The banker's case rests principally on custom, since there is, to date, almost
no "law" available. The authoritative statement of banking custom is the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documcntary Credits.03 As
revised in 1951 these Customs have been adhered to by American banks and
by the banks in most European countries, except England; they are incorpor-
ated by reference in most foreign credits issued by American banks. Before
the 1951 revision the Customs contained a fairly simple provision on transfer.154
The revision, which the American banks were instrumental in effecting, came
up with a more complicated formulation, which gives the issuing bank a much
tighter control over the transfer of its credits in several respects.lc In the
151. The statement in the text is apparently supported by ,VAnD & M-Tmp, op. cit.
supra note 148, at 139. Under the heading "Assignment of proceeds" the authors vrite:
"From the bank's point of view there should be no objection to such an assignment. If
the assignee properly notifies the bank of the assignment, the bank is required to recognize
it and to pay according to the tenor of the assignment whatever would otherwise have
been payable to the original beneficiary."
152. This statement also is supported by WArm & Hr.FIELD, op. cit. suipra nite 148,
at 137. Under the heading "Drafts drawn to Lender or Supplier-Agency" the authors
state a hypothetical case in which the beneficiary of a credit draws drafts to his own order
and negotiates them to his supplier, and then comment: "If the credit is a negotiation
credit with an undertaking running to holders and endorsers, and if those drafts are
presented to the bank accompanied by propfr documents, the bank may not only pay
them in safety, but is under a duty to do so." The term "negotiation credit" is explained
in text at note 158 infra.
153. See note 149 supra.
154. The earlier text of the Custcnns is found in Brochure No. 82 of the ,tcri:atiornal
Chamber of Commerce (1933). Article 49 on Transfer reads as follows:
"A credit can only be transferred on the express authority of the principal.
In this case the credit can be transferred once only, and on the terms and
conditions specified in the original credit, with the exception of the amount
of the credit and of the time of validity, which both may be reduced.
"If a Commercial Documentary Credit is transferred by fractions, such
fractional transfers shall be considered as constituting one single transfer
only.
"Authority to transfer a credit covers authority to transfer it to another
place. Bank charges entailed by such transfers are payable by the original
beneficiary unless otherwise specified. During the validity of the original
credit, payment may be made at the place to which the credit has been
transferred."
155. In the 1951 revision Article 49 on Transfer reads as follows:
"A transferable or assignable credit is a credit in which the paying or
negotiating Bank is entitled to pay in whole or in part to a third party or
parties on instructions given by the first beneficiary.
"A credit can be transferred only on the express authority of the olening
Bank and provided that it is e-xpressly designated as 'transferable' or
'assignable.' In such case the credit can be transferred once only (that is
to say that the third party or parties designated by the first beneficiary are
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1933 formulation it was the "principal" on whose authority the transfer could
be made: the term was not defined but presumably referred to the bank's
customer, the buyer. In the revision this authority is lodged in the "opening
Bank," which, so far as the language goes, can now authorize transfer without
the consent, and even against the will, of its customer. Furthermore, no trans-
fer, even so authorized, is to be binding upon the "bank which is to act there-
under" except as "such Bank" expressly consents and until its charges are
paid. The shift in terminology from "opening Bank" to "Bank which is to
act thereunder" suggests that even when the opening bank has authorized
transfer, another bank which has confirmed the credit 1,0 need not recognize
the transfer until it has consented and been paid a fee. Finally, only a credit
expressly designated as "transferable" or "assignable" can be transferred at
all1' 57
not entitled to retransfer it), and on the terms and conditions specified in
the original credit, with the exception of the amount of the credit, of any
unit price stated therein, and of the time of validity or of shipping, any or
all of which may be reduced or curtailed. In the event of any reduction in
amount or unit price, a transferer may be permitted to substitute his own
invoices for those of the transferee, for amounts or unit prices greater than
those set forth in the transferee's invoices, but not in excess of the original
sum stipulated in the credit, and upon such substitution of invoices, the
transferer may draw under the credit for the difference between his invoices
and the tranferee's invoices.
"Fractions of a transferable or assignable credit (not exceeding in the
aggregate the amount of the entire credit) may be transferred separately
provided partial shipments are not excluded, and the aggregate of such trans-
fers will be considered as constituting only one transfer of the entire credit.
"Authority to transfer a credit includes authority to transfer it to a bene-
ficiary in another place whether in the same country or not, unless otherwise
specified. During the validity of the credit as transferred, payment or nego-
tiation may be made at the place to which the credit has been transferred.
"Bank charges entailed by transfers are payable by the first beneficiary
unless otherwise specified.
"No transfer shall be binding upon the Bank which is to act thereunder
except to the extent and in the manner expressly consented to by such Bank,
and until such Bank's charges for transfer are paid."
156. A bank which "confirms" a credit issued by another bank is in effect issuing its
own credit on which it is primarily liable (subject of course to reimbursement by the
issuer). A bank which merely "advises" the beneficiary of the opening of a credit
in his favor without "confirming" it does not become liable. See WARD AND HAYIELIJ,
op. cit. suprc note 148, at 23-5; UCC § 5-103(1) (e) and (f). See the form of con-
firmation used in Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 144 F.2d 759, 761 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1944): "[W]e confirm the credit and thereby undertake that all drafts drawn and
presented as above specified will be duly honored by us."
157. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F.2d 950, 955 n.1 (1st Cir. 1952)
the letter of credit issued by the Chase National Bank provided: "Should this credit
be assigned by you to ... another party all drafts presented to us must be accompanied
by your letter of assignment, and our commission charge of s of 1% is to be paid by
you at the time of such actual assignment." This was presumably a "transferable" or
"assignable" credit.
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Bankers distinguish between "straight" credits and "negotiation" credits. In
the straight credit the bank's obligation is expressed in a clause like the follow-
ing: "We hereby engage with you [the seller-beneficiary] that all drafts drawn
under and in compliance with the terms of this credit wil be honored...." In
a negotiation credit the bank's obligation is stated to run, not to "you," but
to "the drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders of drafts drawn and nego-
tiated in compliance with the terms of this credit. ."1s Presumably
neither a straight credit nor a negotiation credit would qualify as a credit
"expressly designated as 'transferable' or 'assignable' "-although either could
be made so by the addition of appropriate language.
The Transfer Article of the Customs does not clearly differentiate between
the assignment of the right to draw under the credit and the assignment of
proceeds or the negotiation of drafts. The reference to the transferor's right,
after transfer, to "draw under the credit for the difference between his invoices
and the transferee's invoices" suggests that an assignment of the right to draw
was meant and the Article could reasonably be construed as applying only to
that type of assignment. It is believed to be the general banking understand-
ing, however, that the Article applies to assignments of proceeds as wel0I. 9
158. See the forms set out in N.Vrw & H.,RFiELD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 167
et seq.
159. This understanding is borne out by Ericksson v. Refiners E-:port Co., 2G4 App.
Div. 525, 35 N.Y.S2d 829 (1st Dep't 1942), which has, in the absence of comptiti.n,
become a leading case. A statement of the facts of the Er'ktsson case will illustrate the type
of problem here under discussion. The New York Trust Co., acting for its customer the
Swedish Marine Board, issued a special (ie., straight) letter of credit to Refiners Export Co.
covering the sale of gasoline by refiners to Sweden at a price of about $240,COa. Refiners
purchased the gasoline from Cities Service Oil Co. The bank, under instructions from the
Marine Board, refused to amend the credit so that it could be assigned to Cities Service.
Refiners nevertheless "assigned the letter of credit" to Cities Service and then notified
the Trust Co. that "the letter . . .and its proceeds" had been assigned. Refiners drew
a draft under the credit which it endorsed to the order of Cities Service. Cities Service
notified the Trust Co. to credit its account with the proceeds of the draft on performance
of the letter by Refiners. After all these events, the draft and shipping documents vwcre
presented to the Trust Co. (apparently by Refiners). Meanwhile the Marine Board had
brought an action in New York against Refiners for alleged breach of another contract
involving the sale of toluol. (The facts on which the breach of contract suit wcre prcdi-
cated are set out in Kingdom of Sweden v. N. Y. Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 9& X.Y.S2d
779 (Sup. Ct. 1949).) After presentment of the draft and documents to the bank, but
before payment, the sheriff levied on the proceeds of the gasoline credit in aid of the
action on the toluol credit. The gasoline credit incorporated the Uniform Lustoins (1933)
by reference. Held, that the attempted assignment to Cities Service was ineffective, the
funds remained the property of Refiners and were properly subject to a non-resident
attachment in the action by the Marine Board against Refiners. Although the opinion
refers to an assignment "of the credit," it will be noted that the draft wvas dra'.-n and
presented by Refiners, the original beneficiary, and apparently an assignment Uf procccds
only was involved. The court gave weight to the provisions of Article 49 of the Customs,
as that Article read before the 1951 revision. With respect to the value uf Erid:sson as a
precedent, it should be remembered that Article 49 in the 1933 version did not contain
the language about the "transferer's invoices" which, as suggested in the tet, supports
the construction that the Article as revised applies only to assignments of the right to
draw under a credit and not to assignments of proceeds.
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If the negotiation clause in credits is to have any meaning at all, the Article
can hardly apply directly to negotiation of drafts under such credits.110
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code on Documentary Letters of
Credit improves somewhat on the Customs in distinguishing between assign-
ment of the right to draw and assignment of proceeds.' 0 ' As to the first the
Code repeats the provisions of the Customs: such a transfer can be made
"only on the express authority of the issuer and provided that the credit is
expressly designated as transferable or assignable."'162 As to assignment of
proceeds the Code provides:
"The proceeds of a credit may be assigned and the issuer or any
paying, confirming or accepting bank may give effect to the assign-
ment, but unless otherwise agreed, the issuer or any negotiating, pay-
ing, confirming or accepting bank may notwithstanding filing or
notice of any assignment honor or negotiate a draft drawn by the
beneficiary.'
' 1 63
Earlier drafts of the Code had contained provisions going a good deal
further in the direction of free assignability of proceeds. 04 To these provi-
sions counsel for some of the New York banks-whose influence in the field
is preponderant-violently objected. The original draft was progressively
watered down until the final draft emerged, which gives with one hand and
takes back with the other. The proceeds "may be assigned" and the bank
"may give effect to the assignment" (is this saying the same thing twice over,
or two different things?) but the bank may disregard the assignment despite
notice "unless otherwise agreed" (with whom? when? how?). If the Code
is widely enacted and Section 5-115(2) stands in its present form, effective
assignment of the proceeds of a letter may be blocked.
There remains the possibility of assignment of proceeds by negotiation of
drafts drawn under a letter. On this point the banker's position is that there
can be no holder in due course of a draft drawn under a straight credit 15
and that only a negotiating bank (and not, for example, a merchant who has
supplied goods to the beneficiary) can be a holder in due course of a draft
drawn under a negotiation credit. As to the straight credit, the conclusion
rests on the idea that anyone taking a draft in reliance on such a credit is on
notice of its terms, that the credit runs only to seller-beneficiary, and that by
banking custom there can be no holder in due course. The argument may
seem circular, but circularity is not unknown in the law. As to the negotiation
160. Since in the negotiation credit the bank agrees with "drawers, endorsers and
bona fide holders" that drafts properly drawn will be honored, any suggestion that the
bank's consent must be obtained before a negotiation of the draft will be effective would
make the negotiation clause meaningless.
161. UCC § 5-115.
162. UCC § 5-115(1).
163. UCC § 5-115(2).
164. See the 1950 and 1949 drafts of UCC.
165. This was the holding in Ericksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 App. Div. 525,
35 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1942).
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credit, the argument is the same, doubled and redoubled: the promise to pay
"drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders" includes, by banking custom, only
negotiating banks which are bona fide holders. Since there is no case law
on the point, it cannot be said that the opinion of bank counsel is manifestly
wrong.1
60
It may be asked why the bankers have set their faces so stubbornly against
the principle of free assignability which, elsewhere in their business, they find
so attractive. The letter of credit, in its modem form,10 7 until quite recently
has been used exclusively in financing international shipments. With respect
to letters issued to finance imports into the United States, it is easy to sympa-
thize with the banker's reluctance to be put in a position where he must at
his risk pass upon the validity of an assignment under the law of Egypt or
Indonesia. It is also unquestionably true that the incidence of fraud on the
part of sellers shipping from remote parts of the world is higher than in
domestic transactions, so that the preservation of defenses has much to recom-
mend it.
Such arguments lose much of their weight as to assignments made within
the United States under credits issued to finance exports or domestic transac-
tions. On accepted principles of contract law, it may be agreed that an assign-
ment of the right to draw and to assemble documents (i.e., of the right to
perform both the credit and the underlying contract of sale) should not be
effective without the consent of the bank, acting in accord with instructions
from its customer, the buyer. On the other hand, it is hard to see any sound
policy to justify the position that assignments of proceeds alone, made in this
country under laws familiar to the issuing bank, should not be effective, with-
out the bank's consent, like the assignment of any other chose in action against
any other obligor.
A relatively small group of large banks in such cities as New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, and San Francisco has had a virtual monopoly on the
issue of letters of credit-for the good reason that those are the banks known
to sellers abroad, whose letters alone are acceptable. One result of this con-
centration of the letter of credit business has been that only a few jurisdictions
have any modem letter of credit law at all, and only New York has had
enough litigation to have anything like an adequate coverage of even the
major points. One reason why the banks outside the major financial centers
have hesitated to engage in letter of credit financing has been the blank un-
certainty as to the state of the law in most American jurisdictions.
Just as twenty or thirty years ago the trust receipt was successfully adapted
for use in financing domestic transactions, so, according to present indications,
166. But see the quotation from WNrAnm & HAmrF in note 152 supra.
167. There were some examples of letter of credit financing by American banks
in domestic transactions as early as 1800 and recurrently through the 19th century. See
the paper by Karl Llewellyn in WARD & HA=FE.D, BANK Cnr.rrs tam AcCErMx-cEs 63-
72 (3rd ed. 1948). These early uses died natural deaths and seem to have no dircect
filiation with modern letter of credit practice.
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is the international letter of credit about to undergo the same mutation.
As with the trust receipt, the first type of domestic transaction in which the
letter of credit is being used is the sale of automobiles from manufacturer to
dealer. Naturally enough, the international banks which were already familiar
with its use in the overseas transaction have taken the first conscious steps
toward domesticating the letter of credit 168-"conscious" steps because it
is likely that many "country banks" have been issuing documents in domestic
financing which are technically letters of credit without calling them that and,
of course, without any clear understanding of their rights and liabilities. In
this connection the enactment of Article 5 of the Code may become of crucial
importance, since it will provide in most American jurisdictions a body of
letter of credit law which will be more comprehensive than the scattered case
law of the few jurisdictions which now have any. Article 5 may prove to be
of enormous help in stimulating the use of letters of credit in all types of
domestic finance. The danger is that the Article was tailored to the specifica-
tions of the international transaction, and, as the trust receipt experience
shows, there can be unexpected changes in practice when a familiar and ap-
parently well-understood device is put to work in a new setting.109
If we assume the successful adaptation of the letter of credit to the domestic
scene, it is reasonable to expect that the pressure on banks to recognize the
free assignability of proceeds as well as the unrestricted negotiability of drafts
will increase. Both procedures enhance the usefulness of letters of credit to
the mercantile community, both are in line with the development of our com-
mercial law, and the objections of the banks to either lose much of their
validity when translated from international to domestic trade. It is to be
hoped that banking practice-which is frequently more reasonable than bank-
ing forms would suggest-will go along.
The Code's treatment of the assignment of proceeds is unfortunate. It
would have been far better to leave the problem uncodified and to await the
development of case law or at least of practice within the domestic field. In-
deed, if the letter of credit is about to undergo the same type of mutation
168. See the forms developed by the First National Bank of Boston reproduced in
BRAucHER, SUTHERLAND & WILLCOX, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 204-207 (1953).
169. The adaptation of the trust receipt to domestic finance was made during the
1920's. See In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929). The Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, drafted during the 1930's, had nearly fifteen years of domestic experience to build
on. The Act did a brilliant job of straddling two types of essentially unlike transactions
which had both adopted the name "trust receipt": the import trust receipt is typically a
one-shot or non-recurrent transaction, while the domestic trust receipt is a continuing
long-term relationship between entruster and trustee. Much of the Act's obscurity is
attributable to this necessary straddle. Article 5 of the UCC was drafted when the
domestic use of the letter of credit, in its contemporary rebirth, was in its infancy
and before practice had become fixed or generally understood. Under the circumstances
it will be a remarkable, but unlikely, achievement if the Code draftsmen (the final draft
was largely the work of New York bank counsel who were thoroughly familiar with,
but only with, the international letter of credit) have correctly anticipated the changes
in practice which will result from the new setting.
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that the trust receipt went through, it would perhaps have been wiser to defer
the entire project of codifying letter of credit law. Since the banks have
shown no great enthusiasm for the Letter of Credit Article, it might be de-
leted from the Code as enacted. Or, if the Article is included, the section on
transfer and assignment could be dropped. In states which enact the Code and
include that section, we must hope for an enlightened judicial construction.
Fortunately, Section 5-115 is obscurely drafted. A bank may disregard a
notice of assignment and pay the original beneficiary "unless otherwise
agreed." Since the language is permissive in the first place, the "unless other-
wise agreed" phrase would seem to be surplusage if all that the section means
is that a bank may recognize an assignment although it need not. The inclusion
of the apparently unnecessary phrase, together with the Code's freewheeling
definition of "agreed,"' 17 makes at least possible an open-ended construction
of the section in the light of developing banking and trade practice. And,
although the banks have never cared for it, there is distinguished precedent
for the proposition that banking custom is what the banks do in fact rather
than what the banks say they do.
171
The only support for the banking theory restricting the negotiability of
drafts drawn under credits is "custom." But the "custom" appealed to is a
banking, not a mercantile, custom, so that the banks are on doctrinally shaky
ground in arguing that their custom should bind other groups who may or
may not know of it. The tight-knit group of professional merchants which
makes use of the international letter of credit may reasonably be assumed to
be familiar with the banking custom and thus bound by it-if the custom is
borne out in practice. But if the letter of credit comes into use in the domestic
market, the question of custom takes on an entirely different color. Neither
the issuing bank, nor the customer nor the beneficiary, nor for that matter
the court, may be familiar with the "custom" of the New York banks or the
esoteric distinction between "straight" credits and "negotiation" credits. An
analogy lying near at hand might be the group of cases involving a bank which
has discounted seller's draft on buyer. In those cases, typically, the bank has
claimed and been properly granted a value position free of buyer-seller dis-
putes.'7 2 It might be difficult, once the analogy Awas pointed out, for bank
170. UCC § 1-201(3): " 'Agreed' or 'Agreement' means the bargain in fact as found
in the language of the parties or in course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance or by implication from other circumstances."
171. Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945). For a criticism of the Dixon case from a banldng point of
view, see Backus and Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credit; The Dixon, Jrmnaos Case,
52 Col. L. REv. 589 (1952) ; for a defense of the case, Honnold, Letters of Credit, Custom,
Missing Docnonwts and the Dixon Case: A RePv to Bahr:is and Harfield, 53 CAL. L.
REV. 504 (1953).
172. See, e.g., Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 Pac.
869 (1920). There are a few minority cases denying the bank's claim, e.g., Nat. Vank:
of Commerce v. Morgan, 207 Ala. 65, 92 So. 10 (1921); see the trenchant criticism of
the Morgan case in STErFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AN IJVEShIl:aT PAPEn 550-551
(1939).
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counsel to explain why a purchaser of a draft which a bank has promised to
honor should be treated differently from a purchaser' of a draft which a
mercantile buyer who is not a bank has promised to honor.
Accounts Receivable Financing
The predicted mutation in the use of the letter of credit is nothing more than
a prediction. In another area of 'commercial financing-the taking of accounts
receivable as collateral security-there has already been over the past ten
or fifteen years a dramatic increase in volume of transactions. On theory
alone we should expect to see signs that lenders against this relatively new
type of commercial collateral are demanding their traditional good-faith-pur-
chase position free of equities and defenses. Nor are the signs lacking.
Nothing less like a negotiable instrument can be imagined than an open
account receivable. Here we have not even an "indispensable writing" suscept-
ible of transfer "in the customary manner" which has hitherto underlain all
developments toward negotiability. And even though we have long since aban-
doned the common law proposition that choses in action are non-assignable,
the law still seems clear enough on the necessity of the assignee standing in
the assignor's shoes and the right of the account debtor not only to assert his
defenses but even to prohibit the assignment of claims against him.
It is black letter law that the obligor of a chose in action, an account debtor,
has the power to prohibit assignment of the claim by an appropriate term in
the underlying contract. The proposition is canonized in the Restatement of
Contracts with no suggestion that the question is in any way doubtful."7 a Ol
the other hand, if we look to what the courts have been doing to "no assign-
ment" clauses for the past thirty years a different story begins to unfold.1 74
In case after case where a commercial debtor has sought to prohibit assign-
ment, the courts have regularly managed to construe the heart out of the
clause before them and, while reciting by dictum that a no assignment clause
is good, hold that in this case no intent to forbid the assignment appears. The
no assignment right is one of those peculiar legal rules which are honored
almost exclusively in the breach.
A recent case deserves comment, if only because it finds the New York
Court of Appeals uncharacteristically swimming against the current. In All-
husen v. Caristo Construction Corp. 7 5 there had been an assignment to a
bank (followed by a further assignment to plaintiff) of moneys due and to
become due under a contract which contained the term: "The assignment . . .
of any money due or to become due [hereunder] . . . without the written
consent of the first party [the obligor] shall be void." The Court of Appeals
unanimously upheld an order of the trial court dismissing the complaint on
173. RFSTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 151 (1932).
174. See the excellent discussion in 4 CoRBi , CONTRACTS §§ 872-3 (1951).
175. 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 891 (1952); Notes, 21 FORD L. REv. 178 (1952), 27
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 361 (1952), [1952] Wis. L. REV. 740.
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defendant's motion made "on the sole ground" 7 that the prohibitory clause
was a complete defense to the action by the assignee. A dissent in the Appel-
late Division suggested that the "account receivable was assignable by nature,
and could not be rendered otherwise without imposing an unlawful restraint
upon the power of alienation of property."17 7 Counsel for the appellant put
the same idea in different language, stating that "a prohibtion against the
assignment of money due under a private contract is per se invalid."178
It is not without interest that a judge in the intermediate court of appeal as
well as counsel on appeal to the highest court were willing to support so novel
a proposition. It is of greater interest that the Court of Appeals, in repelling
these suggestions, was unable to cite a single New York precedent which
had held that a no assignment clause wnas a defense to an action by an assignee.
It was forced to fall back uncomfortably on the dicta in cases which had held
the reverse, noting that none of the earlier cases had involved "a contractual
provision against assignments framed in the language of the clause now before
us."179 Furthermore nothing in the court's opinion betrays awareness that the
conditions of accounts receivable financing had changed in any way since
the late 19th or early 20th century, when the cases principally relied on had
been decided. The case stands as a monument to the purest type of conceptual-
ism, untainted by a breath of the workaday world.'8 9
The draftsmen of the Commercial Code took the plunge from which tie Court
of Appeals had shrunk in the Alhusen case. Under Section 9-318(4) "[a] term
prohibiting assignment of an account or contract right is ineffective." 151 The
Code rule gives to commercial accounts the free assignability which is a basic
element of negotiability. It has, for that reason, been widely applauded by
176. Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Corp. 303 N.Y. 446, 449, 103 N.E.2d 891 (1952).
177. Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 278 App. Div. 817, 104 N.Y.S_2d 565, 5C6
(1951) (dissenting opinion by Van Voorhris, J.), quoted in the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, 303 N.Y. 446, 450, 103 N.E.2d 891, 892 (1952).
178. Id. at 447.
179. Id. at 450, 103 N.E.2d at 892.
180. It may be that the Allzusen case will be quietly buried and forgotten by means
of the familiar judicial technique of restricting a case to its own peculiar facts. In
Schnitzer v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 128 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247-8 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1954),the vendee had mortgged property to plaintiff in spite of a conditional sale cntract
which required the vendee to keep the property "free from liens and encumbrances."
The court said: "Defendant, however, asserts the invalidity of plaintiff's assignment from
the buyer on the grounds (1) that the conditional sales coitract prohibits assignment....
Both grounds are devoid of merit. In the first place the conditional sales contract before
us has no provision against assignment by the vendee, and such restriction will not be
implied. See: Allhusen v. Caristo Const. Corp .... [A]n assignment in violaticn of a
clause requiring vendor's consent constitutes at most a default entitling the seller
to resort to available remedies as in the case of non-payment [citing N.Y. Puns. Pnor.
LAW § 73]."
181. The Comment to § 9-318(4) closely parallels the foregoing discussion in the
text. While it would be attractive to shore up these suggestions by citation to such
distinguished authority, a more likely explanation of the parallelism is that both discus-
sions were written by the same person.
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the same financial circles which have been stoutly maintaining the nonassign-
ability of proceeds of, and the nonnegotiability of drafts drawn under, bank
letters of credit.
On the problem of the assignee's freedom from contract defenses, the Code's
draftsmen adopted an approach notably more conventional than the one sug-
gested by Section 9-318(4). Outside the consumer field the Code broadly
validates an agreement by an account debtor not to assert defenses against an
assignee. 182 In the absence of such an agreement the rights of the assignee are
subject to "all the terms" of the underlying contract and all defenses and
claims arising therefrom as well as to all claims and defenses arising from
any source which accrue before notification of the assignment.183 The valida-
tion of the waiver of defense clause in a commercial setting is good as far as
it goes and is a useful reminder that the restrictive holdings in the consumer
field should not be allowed to slop over into the commercial field. A more
radical solution, in harmony with Section 9-318(4), would have been to
allow commercial accounts automatically to pass free of defenses in the same
way that negotiable instruments do, without requiring the insertion of the
cut-off clause. Since accounts receivable financing is clearly here to stay, we
may anticipate that the next general codification will as a matter of course
adopt the solution that now appears to be too "radical." In the meantime
we may hope for a liberal construction of the Code's waiver of defense pro-
visions and a comparable case-law development in non-Code states.
Accounts receivable financing has been immeasurably facilitated by statutes
governing the assignment of accounts, which have been enacted by more than
thirty states since 1943.184 Before the passage of these statutes a major road-
block in the way of a large scale development of receivables financing had
been the unutterable confusion of the common law on the important question
of the rights of successive assignees of the same accounts. At common law
an assignee who failed to notify the debtor of the assignment stood to lose to
later assignees in a variety of circumstances.18 5 Despite the chilly common law
attitude, the finance companies who first began to experiment with commercial
loans on the security of accounts during the 1930's found that the business
advantages of nonnotification financing outweighed the imponderable legal
risks which they assumed. Sooner or later the courts would have bowed to
the necessity of protecting lenders engaged in legitimate and useful business oper-
ations. But by one of the delightful vagaries of the legal process, relief came much
sooner than it might have been expected and from a totally unexpected quarter.
In the celebrated Klauder case 180 the Supreme Court had apparently made
182. UCC§9-206(2).
183. UCC § 9-318(1).
184. Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing: The Real Effect of Amended 60(a)
on Accounts Receivable Financing, 64 HARV. L. REV. 62 (1950) collects the statutory
citations.
185. See 4 CoRBiN, CoNArxcrs § 902 (1951).
186. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
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nonnotification financing of accounts receivable in most American jurisdic-
tions vulnerable to attack as a voidable preference under Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act as it then read. There was no need for those engaged in that
type of financing to ask for whom the bell tolled. But, instead of meekly giving
up the ghost, they resolutely stormed the state legislatures which, because
federal bankruptcy law largely rests upon rights conferred by state law, held
the keys of salvation. To get rid of Klauder, it was necessary to provide by
statute that no assignee could be subordinated to any later assignee, regardless
of notification to the debtor. The common law was abrogated root, stock and
branch.
lany of the statutes were weirdly drafted and were whooped through the
legislatures like a declaration of war. The early ones were mostly so-called
"validation" statutes, protecting the assignee against all comers without any
requirement of public notice. Later, good sense broke out, and the subsequent
statutes impose a duty of filing as a condition of protection, although the filing
provisions are by no means uniform and occasionally read as if they had been
drafted at the local institution for the feeble minded. The one detail on which
all the statutes are consistent is that no assignee who has achieved "protection"
need worry about being displaced by a later laborer in the vineyard. Some of
them go so far as to suggest that such an assignee, who has allowed the
assignor to collect accounts and use the proceeds in carrying on his business,
may follow the proceeds into the hands of a creditor who has received payment
from the assignor in the ordinary course of business-a result hardly to be
countenanced by anyone pretending to sanity.'
5 7
The accounts receivable developments show that there can be something
new under the sun. For the first time in the long history of the good faith
purchase idea it is being applied to a species of intangible property where
there is no "indispensable writing" which can be taken as a symbolic repre-
sentation of the claim. The several important attributes of negotiability
which have in the past flowed from the merging of the obligations into the
paper are hardly conceivable in the accounts receivable context: there is no
written evidence executed by the obligor which can be pointed to as being
itself "the debt." And yet, despite the absence of anything resembling an
"instrument," good faith purchase is once more running its normal courie
under the stimulus of the same commercial pressures which have so many
times in the past led to the creation of negotiable instruments, quasi-negotialie
instruments and just-a-little-bit-negotiable instruments.
The only legal certainty is the certainty of legal change. Put if we teel.
our categories broad and flexible, we can, as lawyers, do a gud deal to ,ee
that the change which will come in any case is helped into being, is integrated
into the body of the law as part of an ordered pattern and not left to come
187. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STATS. § 6721 (Rev. 1949); N.C. GE:. S.rTs Z 44-tSi
(1950). It is not suggested that the statutes were meant to he copstrucd, should k,
construed or will be construed in the manner indicated in the tent. But the -tatut .ry
language overshot its mark by the distance of a light year.
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lurching and banging destructively into the vulnerable framework of a too
rigidly conceived structure of doctrine, principles and rules. In a recent
paper on jurisprudence Professor Fuller of Harvard has neatly expressed
what can be done. Writing of the conflict between the skeptic who sees only
formless, chaotic and unpatterned change in the law and the traditionalist who
sees only absolutes, Professor Fuller suggests by analogy a middle ground:
"A book on gardening contains the following sentence: 'In prun-
ing the fundamental rule is to respect the natural growing habits of
the plant being pruned.' If our skeptic is consistent he will reject this
statement as being utterly absurd. He will say that if you truly re-
spect the growing habits of a plant you will not prune it at all.'
Pruning is an interference with nature; it cannot therefore be guided
by nature. I doubt that our skeptic would in fact take this view. I
think he would keep his epistemology out of the garden. He would
hold his 'logic' on a sufficiently short leash so that he could absorb
whatever wisdom is contained in the innocent sentence quoted. If
he were a serious gardener he would set about observing trees tinder
various growing conditions so that he would learn how to help a
tree be what it is."'
1 a
188. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEa. ED. 457, 472-3
(1954).
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